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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) initiated a multi-country 
initiative to better understand the dynamics of investing in human capital. The project 
sought to identify potential opportunities for governments to increase expenditure on the 
sectors that matter most for children and to close critical investment gaps while maintaining 
fiscal sustainability (through fiscal space analyses), as well as to pinpoint entry points for 
UNICEF to more effectively influence government spending decisions (through political 
economy analyses). In total, fiscal space and political economy analyses were carried out 
in 16 countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa region (ESAR) between 2016 and 2018. 
Drawing on information from the country studies as well as from global databases, four 
key findings emerge. 
The first finding is that investment in core human capital sectors is expected to slightly 
decrease in ESAR in the near term, but that there are significant variations across 
countries. Based on information from the macro-fiscal programming models that were 
developed for each country, real per child expenditure was projected to decline by an 
average of about 6 per cent over five-year periods. At country level, however, the outlooks 
were very diverse. Five countries were projected to undergo deep contractions in real per 
child expenditure (between 10 and 30 per cent) and three to have smaller declines (in the 
2-5 per cent range), while modest increases (around 3.5 per cent) were forecast in two 
countries and substantial rises (between 20 and 90 per cent) in six countries.
The second finding is that all countries have at least one very strong option to create fiscal 
space in support of greater investment in children and human capital in the near term. 
Seven categories of fiscal space were assessed. These included: (i) increasing government 
revenue; (ii) increasing official development assistance (ODA); (iii) reprioritizing spending; 
(iv) improving the efficiency of spending; (v) borrowing; (vi) using fiscal savings; and (vii) 
capturing and/or preventing illicit financial flows. The application of a simple classification 
system based on available information suggests that, on average, countries have around 
three high-potential and two medium-potential categories that could merit further 
exploration at country level. One group of countries – Botswana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda 
and the United Republic of Tanzania – were identified as having at least four high-potential 
categories available, while Angola, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia were found to 
have three each. 
Reprioritizing the budget, increasing revenue and addressing spending inefficiencies are 
the most promising avenues to expand fiscal space in the region. The country projections 
showed reprioritization to have the biggest potential returns, increasing real per child 
expenditure by around 6 per cent a year above the investment levels predicted by the 
business-as-usual scenarios over the near term. Overall, this approach was found to have 
high potential in 13 of the countries studied. In terms of revenue, while most countries 
are expected to benefit from natural growth, rising prices and bigger populations will 
minimize the impact of larger budgets on the development of human capital. However, the 
low capacity to extract taxes from the economy observed in most countries underscores 
opportunities for domestic resource mobilization, especially through improved tax 
administration. Many of the modelling exercises also demonstrated the positive impacts 
of increasing the efficiency or rates of value added tax, as well as personal and corporate 
income taxes, on human capital expenditure. Lastly, a review of budget execution and 
credibility rates in the education and health sectors revealed the severity of one type of 
spending inefficiency across countries, indicating that the removal of bottlenecks could 
significantly boost actual levels of investment in core human capital areas in many contexts.
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Advocating for more ODA and cracking down on illicit financial flows also appeared as 
good options to augment fiscal space in sub-groups of countries. On the foreign aid 
front, if governments – especially in low-income countries – can convince donors that 
additional resources will deliver strong value for money and be accompanied by robust 
accountability mechanisms, they should be able to make a compelling case for more 
grants and concessional loans, given the existing human capital deficits. Meanwhile, the 
estimated magnitude of illicit financial flows is staggering in many countries, and any 
actions that can prevent, capture and effectively tax these resources could go a long way 
toward increasing expenditure on human capital.
Other options did not show strong potential for generating fiscal space. For example, 
all 16 governments have spent far beyond their means in recent years, which has led to 
extraordinary debt accumulation. The prevailing debt distress concerns coupled with the 
difficulties of borrowing to invest in social sectors – which only generate returns over 
long horizons – make this an unlikely pathway for most governments. At the same time 
investing fiscal savings that are stored in sovereign wealth funds could be a viable option 
in the distant future for the group of countries that are expected to become significant 
natural resource exporters. However, questions surrounding the timelines for and 
management of future revenues remain too great at present for this to be a realistic near-
term consideration.
The third finding is that each fiscal space opportunity faces strong headwinds. For instance, 
increasing the budgetary priority given to human capital sectors requires competing 
against other agendas as well as non-negotiable spending items, such as debt repayment, 
which is ballooning in many places. In terms of revenue, real GDP growth will likely 
continue to disappoint in most places, which limits the easiest way to raise investment in 
human capital – natural revenue growth. At the same time, improving tax administration is 
a long-term process that is unlikely to yield significant near-term gains. Similarly, there are 
no easy fixes to the multitude of technical challenges that prevent human capital budgets 
from being efficiently and fully utilized. Turning to ODA, free and/or cheap money should 
always be a good thing, but over-dependence and the persistence of parallel systems 
have serious development consequences, while the recent commitment among donors to 
better target ODA to the poorest countries will increasingly restrict eligibility in the region. 
And improving tax enforcement capacity and stifling corruption are the main solutions to 
handle and tax illicit financial flows, both of which are very difficult in practice. 
The fourth finding is that there are many entry points for UNICEF to support the scaling 
up of investment in sectors that are foundational to child well-being. In the formulation 
phase of the budget cycle, UNICEF can influence national dialogue by delivering strategic 
messages on the importance of investing in human capital – including through investment 
cases – while also integrating children’s needs into key budget planning documents. At 
the sector level, supporting the costing of strategies and plans is essential for identifying 
resource gaps and making a strong case for greater allocations, which is often not done 
or not done well. There are also openings to help social sector ministries develop stronger 
budget proposals, as well as to facilitate discussions with finance ministries around their 
budgetary needs. These efforts can be further complemented by research and advocacy 
on reorienting the budget and channelling new revenue flows to support greater funding 
for human capital. At the approval phase, the parliament, which is a partner that is often 
unexploited by UNICEF in its public finance work, can benefit from support to scrutinize 
the draft budget and identify funding gaps, training to enhance knowledge of how the 
budget affects children, and efforts to institutionalize the production of routine budget 
analyses. The budget execution phase is arguably one of UNICEF’s greatest opportunities 
to contribute to fiscal space, which can be achieved by diagnosing and removing budget 
execution bottlenecks. Lastly, given that advocacy for greater funding ultimately hinges 
on having access to reliable information and discussion platforms, UNICEF offices can 
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continue their efforts to support improved budget transparency and accountability 
practices across the budget cycle, which can also help governments be better positioned 
to attract greater ODA flows and borrow.
Fiscal space for children and human capital is a big challenge. Identifying an opportunity 
is one thing; creating fiscal space in practice – that is, overcoming the headwinds – and 
then transforming it into greater investment in human capital sectors – that is, influencing 
the politics that underlie budget allocation decisions – are entirely different and complex 
processes. Nonetheless, the critical starting point is to understand the likely human capital 
investment trajectory. And while the modelling exercises suggested mixed outcomes, 
the very low human capital bases in all countries mean that maximum efforts should be 
devoted to increasing expenditure as quickly as possible. UNICEF’s quest is therefore to 
influence that trajectory. 
The country studies offer a strategic road map. In all the contexts, the fiscal space analyses 
identified at least one category that shows strong potential over the near term. From here, 
it is important to update and re-evaluate those promising scenarios, and to develop a plan 
to operationalize the best ideas. As revealed in the political economy analyses, although 
daunting, country offices can navigate forward by adapting to the dynamics of the budget 
process. They can also pursue multiple strategies, recognizing that small amounts of fiscal 
space from different sources can significantly alter the investment trajectory and – if well 
used – transform children’s lives and the economic and social outlooks of their countries.
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION
The Eastern and Southern Africa region (ESAR) faces a series of daunting development 
challenges. Front and centre is child poverty. On average, nearly two in every three children 
in the region suffer from multiple dimensions of poverty. These range from lack of access 
to basic things like clean drinking water and safe places to wash and go to the toilet, and 
essential services like health and education, to suffering from hunger or emotional and 
physical violence.1 The ongoing demographic boom is another pressing issue. Between 
2019 and 2050, the 0-17 population in ESAR will nearly double – from around 250 million 
to 400 million.2 In practical terms, service delivery systems, which already fall far short 
in terms of coverage and quality, are being are under increasing stress from the growing 
demand. The region has also seen dramatic changes in the development financing 
landscape over the past decade, with official development assistance (ODA) declining 
considerably in most countries.3 This means that governments need to continuously scale 
up domestic investment in basic social services just to maintain a stable level of per capita 
expenditure each year. And if they are to have any realistic chance of benefiting from a 
demographic dividend, governments will need to significantly increase investment in 
human capital to address both current and future deficits. 
UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) initiated a multi-
country initiative to better understand the dynamics of investing in human capital. 
The project had two main objectives. The first was to identify a set of feasible options 
available for governments to increase expenditure on the sectors that matter most for 
children and human capital development while maintaining fiscal sustainability (a fiscal 
space analysis). And the second was to pinpoint strategic entry points for UNICEF to 
more effectively engage in and influence government investment processes, given the 
prevailing political and economic context (a political economy analysis). While the fiscal 
space analysis was meant to open financing discussions with government counterparts 
and serve as a tool that can be updated and expanded, the political economy analysis 
aimed to inform UNICEF’s internal strategies to more meaningfully engage in and 
influence public finance processes. The methodologies were field tested in Zambia at the 
end of 2016 and further refined in a first group of country studies in early 2017 (Burundi, 
Kenya, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania); the final group was completed 
in September 2018. In total, the complementary studies were carried out in 16 countries 
in ESAR.
Drawing on the findings from the 16 country studies, this report has two objectives. The 
first is to identify opportunities available to governments in ESAR to increase investment 
in human capital. Building on the World Bank’s Human Capital Project, human capital 
investments are considered those that directly contribute to child survival, health and 
education – namely, the health, education, social protection, child protection, and 
water and sanitation sectors.4 The second objective is to highlight strategic entry points 
for UNICEF to more effectively influence national budget processes and close critical 
investment gaps. In the countries that participated in this initiative, it is hoped that the 
1  Based on the latest child poverty reports produced by UNICEF offices in ESAR, which are available at: https://www.
unicef.org/esaro/resources_child-poverty-analysis.html.
2  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2017). UN DESA World Population Prospects: 
2017 Revision (medium variant estimates).
3  United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2017). Financing for Development: 
The state of budget transparency and investments in children in Africa. Nairobi and Washington, DC: UNICEF ESARO and 
IBP.
4  World Bank (2018). Human Capital Project. Washington, DC.
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evidence and strategies will continue to be updated and used by UNICEF and partners 
to influence public financial management (PFM) processes and decisions to enhance the 
investment outlook for children. Elsewhere, it is hoped that this approach can be adapted 
and used to advance the financing of human capital agendas.
The remainder of the report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background 
and findings from the fiscal space analyses and Chapter 3 the political economy analyses; 
Chapter 4 then provides concluding thoughts, including a discussion of some of the 
key challenges around generating fiscal space and channelling additional resources to 
human capital sectors. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
FISCAL SPACE FOR CHILDREN AND 
HUMAN CAPITAL IN EASTERN AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICA
This chapter presents the main findings from the fiscal space analyses that were carried 
out in 16 countries in ESAR. It starts by describing the process that was followed to develop 
each study at the country level, which is followed by a short overview of the economic 
situation across the countries to illustrate the vast differences in income, economic sizes 
and growth trends of the sample. Next, it discusses the definitions and trends in government 
expenditure on human capital, including a review of key challenges around planning, 
implementing and monitoring related budgets. The chapter then introduces the concept of 
fiscal space that was used to design the country-level approach. This is complemented by 
a regional assessment of the main components of fiscal space based on information and 
projections from global databases, which sets the stage for presenting the country-specific 
findings from the modelling exercises. To conclude, the chapter attempts to identify the 
most promising avenues for the region – and individual countries – to expand investment 
in human capital sectors. 
2.1 Background to the country studies
The 16 fiscal space exercises started by identifying “priority” sectors for children and recent 
government investment trends in these areas. The priority sectors were defined following 
discussions with government counterparts. At a minimum, these covered education, 
health and social protection, which, when combined, form the foundation of human capital 
and children’s welfare in a country. These definitions were then used to analyse recent 
government investment trends, including the share of the total budget devoted to human 
capital areas as well as the level of those investments, in relation to both gross domestic 
product (GDP) and the size of the population.
Total priority non-interest expenditure =
Tax and non-tax, non-interest revenue (excluding external grants)
+ External and internal interest receipts
+ External grants
Total non-priority, non-interest expenditure
+ External debt disbursements
External debt service (repayment and interest)
Internal Interest
+ Net internal financing flows (= fiscal gap)
Table 2.01. The fiscal space accounting framework
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With the historical analysis in hand, a fiscal space accounting framework was developed 
to assess how human capital investments could be increased going forward. Each exercise 
was based on a macro-fiscal programming model that projected the evolution of fiscal 
space according to different medium-term scenarios. Using a fiscal space accounting 
framework (Table 2.01), the model was constructed with national data on expenditure, 
revenue, borrowing, foreign aid, economic output and so on, as well as with projections 
for key economic, fiscal and demographic variables from global sources (mainly the 
International Monetary Fund or IMF and the United Nations). Afterwards, the base scenario 
was compared to alternative scenarios to identify potential opportunities to invest more in 
core human capital sectors. 
The fiscal space accounting framework was established using a set of neutral, non-
controversial assumptions. Based on historical data, the base scenario projected what 
would happen in a business-as-usual situation. In this way, the country studies attempted 
to address the question of whether the government possesses adequate capacity to fund 
human capital expenditure in the future, typically over a five-year projection period. The 
results from these baseline scenarios are presented for all countries in Section 2.4.
The analysis then looked at and evaluated options to increase the availability of fiscal 
space. The fiscal space accounting framework enabled looking at the consequences of sets 
of assumptions (“alternative scenarios”) that describe future macroeconomic conditions 
or policy choices. The approach for identifying and reviewing fiscal space scenarios is 
described below in Section 2.2. The final set of scenarios was selected on the basis of a 
literature review along with discussions with UNICEF staff and government counterparts. 
In each country report, a subset of options was presented as most likely or most feasible 
based on the results of the modelling exercises.
At the country level, the fiscal space work was carried out in three phases. The first phase 
consisted of data collection and a broad review of recent trends in overall and human 
capital expenditure. The second phase involved developing the macro-fiscal programming 
model to project the evolution of expenditure on human capital. This included preparing the 
base scenario and then comparing that to the alternative scenarios as agreed by different 
stakeholders. The final phase was the production of an analytical report to summarize the 
results.5 Annex 1 presents an abbreviated summary of how the fiscal space analysis was 
carried out at country level. 
2.2 Framework for assessing fiscal space
The approach developed in this regional initiative built on prior efforts to describe and 
understand the concept of fiscal space. Perhaps the most widely-cited definition is from 
a 2005 IMF Policy Discussion Paper.6 This referred to fiscal space as the “availability of 
budgetary room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose 
without any prejudice to the sustainability of a government’s financial position.” In 2007, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offered a slightly different perspective 
by contextualizing fiscal space within human development objectives and presenting a 
simple assessment framework. Known as the “fiscal space diamond,” this consisted of 
four channels to generate resources: (i) ODA; (ii) domestic revenue mobilization; (iii) deficit 
financing; and (iv) reprioritization and efficiency of expenditures.7
5  The final reports are available here: https://www.unicef.org/esaro/resources_fiscal-space-analysis.html.
6  Heller, P. (2005). Understanding Fiscal Space. IMF Policy Discussion Paper, PDP/05/4, page 3.
7  R Roy, R., Heuty, A. and Letouzé, E. (2007). Fiscal Space for What? Analytical Issues from a Human Development 
Perspective. G-20 Workshop on Fiscal Policy. Istanbul, Turkey, 30 June to 2 July 2007. New York City: UNDP, page 6.
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In 2011, UNICEF put forth a more comprehensive approach by unpacking and expanding 
the fiscal space diamond.8 This included several important differences, which are discussed 
below. 
First, it presented “reprioritization” and “efficiency of expenditures” as separate pathways 
to create fiscal space.  This was a pragmatic consideration as one is about the design of 
the national budget (i.e. the overall composition by sectors or ministries) and the other is 
about how budgets are implemented at the sector or ministry level. As such, the underlying 
issues and processes for getting more out of available resources are very different. 
Second, it disaggregated the ODA and deficit financing corners of the diamond, 
recognizing the changing landscapes and complexities of these pathways. On the ODA 
front, this included emphasizing the emergence of influential south-based providers, such 
as from China, India and the Middle East, foundations and new global funds, as well as the 
implementation of new aid modalities (combining market-based lending instruments with 
concessionary features or grants, budget support programmes, etc.). On the debt front, 
the scope was expanded beyond borrowing, acknowledging that fiscal space can also be 
created by re-structuring existing debt obligations and/or repayment terms, which had 
been successfully executed by many governments. 
Third, UNICEF’s approach identified several additional channels that can create fiscal 
space. These included: (i) adopting novel fiscal and monetary policies to boost expenditure, 
some of which were used by governments to respond to the global financial crisis (e.g. 
quantitative easing, printing money); (ii) using fiscal savings, such as those stored in 
sovereign wealth funds, which many governments have at their disposal; (iii) deploying 
foreign exchange reserves to support public-private partnerships and investment in 
development projects; and (iv) preventing and capturing illicit financial flows, which 
are one of the largest potential untapped sources of development financing. In 2017, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF and UN Women jointly published a new 
paper to contextualize this expanded approach to finance the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which further identified social security contributions as another funding 
source available to more advanced economies.9
ESARO’s regional initiative adapted the comprehensive approach to fiscal space that was 
most recently endorsed by various United Nations agencies. A summary of the broad 
areas that were reviewed in the 16 country studies is presented in Table 2.02 below. 
These included: (i) increasing government revenue; (ii) increasing ODA; (iii) reprioritizing 
spending; (iv) improving the efficiency of spending; (v) borrowing; (vi) restructuring 
debt; (vii) using fiscal savings; and (viii) capturing and/or preventing illicit financial flows. 
Additional options were not explored in the country studies due to the limited potential 
to create resources for human capital expenditure given the characteristics of ESAR. 
These included certain types of non-tax revenue (from the sale or rents of state-owned 
enterprises or assets, increasing fees for permits or licenses, increasing fines/penalties, 
etc.), increasing social security contributory revenue from employers and/or employees, 
investing foreign exchange reserves, and printing money.
8  Ortiz, I., Chai, J. and Cummins, M. (2011). Identifying Fiscal Space: Options for Social and Economic Development for 
Children and Poor Households in 184 Countries. UNICEF Social and Economic Policy Working Paper.
9  Ortiz, I., Cummins, M. and Karunanethy, K. (2017). Fiscal Space for Social Protection and the SDGs: Options to Expand 
Social Investments in 187 Countries. ILO Extension of Social Security (ESS) Working Paper No. 48. Geneva: ILO, UNICEF 
and UN Women.
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Options Parameters
1. Increasing 
government 
revenue
• Increasing revenue based on natural economic growth
• Introducing new taxes or increasing tax rates e.g.:
 Â VAT and other consumption/sales taxes, especially on luxury goods
 Â Income taxes (personal and corporate)
 Â Local government taxes (e.g. property, parking)
 Â Sin taxes (e.g. alcohol, tobacco, sugar products)
 Â Carbon taxes (e.g. on polluting industries or products)
 Â Natural resource extraction taxes (e.g. on minerals, oil, gas)
 Â Financial sector taxes (e.g. on currency or equity transactions, capital controls)
 Â Tourism taxes (e.g. on hotel rooms, airline tickets, tourist activities)
 Â Tariffs (on imports and/or exports)
 Â User fees (e.g. for roads, bridges, ports, airports)
 Â Reducing tax exemptions (e.g. on the parastatal sector, imports, capital gains, tax holidays)
• Improving revenue collection capacity (e.g. by strengthening the national revenue authority’s human 
resources, technologies, systems, etc. to enforce existing tax policies and minimize tax evasion)
2. Increasing 
ODA
• Increasing grants and concessional financing from: 
 ÂMultilateral donors: African Development Bank, World Bank, IMF, Islamic Development Bank, 
United Nations etc.
 Â Bilateral donors: International Development Cooperation Agency (China), EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation (European Union), French Development Agency, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
Saudi Fund for Development, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, United States Agency for International Development 
etc.
 Â Global funds: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; 
Global Education Fund, etc.
 Â Foundations: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Ford Foundation, 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, etc.
3. Reprioritizing 
spending
• Reallocating resources away from non-priority sectors (e.g. defence/security) or from spending 
items that distort the economy (e.g. state-owned enterprises) or generate social inequalities (e.g. 
fuel subsidies)
4. Improving 
the efficiency of 
spending
• Improving the efficiency of resources that are allocated to sectors that support human capital e.g. 
by fully spending available resources, minimizing leakages, improving procurement processes to 
get more and better goods/services at lower costs
5. Borrowing • Accessing concessional financing, e.g. from the African Development Bank or World Bank
• Issuing bonds on domestic or international markets
• Borrowing from domestic or international financial institutions
6. Restructuring 
debt
• Refinancing or negotiating a lower interest rate and/or later maturity date to reduce current 
payments on domestic and/or external debt obligations
7. Using fiscal 
savings
• Investing resources stored in sovereign wealth funds (most commonly from natural resource 
income streams) or alternatively accrued through budget surpluses, profits of state-owned 
enterprises, privatization receipts or other government net income
8. Capturing 
and/or 
preventing illicit 
financial flows
Some examples include:
 Â Detecting and deterring cross-border tax evasion
 Â Eliminating anonymous shell companies
 Â Curtailing trade mis-invoices
 Â Strengthening and enforcing anti-money laundering laws and practices
 Â Improving the transparency of multinational corporations
Table 2.02.Main fiscal space options assessed in the 16 country studies
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Figure 2.01. GDP projections and income classification, 2019 (in per capita and billions of 
current US$)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018) for data on GDP and World Bank Country and Lending Groups, Fiscal 
Year 2018-19 for income classifications.
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2.3 The economic context
Fiscal space analyses were carried out in a mix of low-income and middle-income countries 
in ESAR and across very different types of economic situations. Under the World Bank’s 
income classification system, the sample contained an equal balance of eight middle-
income countries – five lower-middle income countries (LMICs) and three upper-middle 
income countries (UMICs) – and eight low income countries (LICs) (Figure 2.01). On one 
side of the spectrum, this included some of the world’s poorest countries, like Burundi, 
Madagascar and Malawi, while on the other side, it contained UMICs with relatively high 
living standards (e.g. Botswana, Namibia, South Africa). At the same time, the sample 
contained a range of economic sizes, from Comoros, with GDP projected to be around 
US$750 million in 2019, to South Africa – near US$400 billion.
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Figure 2.02. Nominal GDP growth, 2017-18 and 2019-20 period averages (as %)
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018).
Recent economic growth performance and short-term projections are equally diverse 
across the sample. In nominal terms, the average growth over the 2017-18 period was 
11.7 per cent for the 16 countries. This was projected to slightly slow down to an average 
of 11.4 per cent over the 2019-20 period (Figure 2.02). While the short-term trajectories for 
most countries follow the regional trend of sustained but not increasing growth, there 
are several outliers. On the negative front, Angola’s economy is expected to slow down 
by more than ten percentage points, from 26 to 15 per cent between the 2017-18 and 
2019-20 periods. Burundi’s economic growth, in contrast, is forecast to continue to rapidly 
accelerate, from 15 to 24 per cent over the same period. All other countries are expected 
to broadly maintain their recent economic growth levels over the near term within a range 
of plus or minus two per cent.
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Figure 2.03. Real per capita GDP growth, 2017-18 and 2019-20 period averages (as %)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018) for data on GDP and World Bank Country and Lending Groups, Fiscal 
Year 2018-19 for income classifications.
However, once factoring in demographic and price changes, the economic growth picture 
becomes much less impressive across the sample. For instance, the rosy outlooks for 
some countries are upended after adjusting economic output projections by the size of the 
population and the inflation index (Figure 2.03). In Burundi, the growth outlook for 2019-20 
tumbles from a robust 24 per cent in nominal terms to negative growth in real per capita 
terms (-2 per cent); in Angola, growth falls from 15 per cent to virtually no growth (0.1 per 
cent) with the same considerations. When looking at the entire sample, 13 countries are 
projected to grow by an average of 2.2 per cent in 2019-20 in real per capita terms, while 
three are countries projected to contract on a real per capita basis (Burundi, Eswatini and 
South Africa).
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2.4 Expenditure on human capital 
2.4.1. Definitions and budget classification issues
Each country developed its own definition of “priority” or human capital expenditure. 
In practice, a series of discussions were held with government counterparts and other 
stakeholders to identify a set of expenditure lines considered directly beneficial to children 
and foundational to human capital. Naturally, this is an arbitrary exercise that creates a 
unique definition of priority expenditure, based on both the choice of “human capital-
friendly” sectors and the budget classification systems that are in place. In general, 
education, health and social protection10 were considered priority expenditure in all 
countries11 (Figure 2.04). In addition, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) spending 
was considered priority expenditure in six countries, nutrition in two countries and child 
protection in two countries.
The definitions of priority expenditure were also affected by the availability and organization 
of budget information. Most of the studies (11) relied on the administrative classification 
of the budget, whereby spending is aligned to government structures (Figure 2.05). 
The other studies were based on the functional classification, with budget information 
organized according to spending objectives. Most of the countries that used the functional 
classification defined priority expenditure beyond education, health and social protection. 
This is unsurprising since information under this classification system tends to make it 
easier to identify spending that cuts across administrative boundaries, as is the case in 
child protection, nutrition and WASH. However, this was not universal. 
2.4.2. Human capital expenditure trends
Before discussing country-level trends according to national definitions, it can be helpful 
to offer a regional perspective of investment in human capital based on comparable 
information. This type of analysis is inherently challenging due to the use of different 
definitions and budget classification systems across countries, but a preliminary picture can 
be obtained by drawing on global efforts to standardize boundaries for core human capital 
sectors – mainly national education accounts and national health accounts (compiled by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization or UNESCO and the 
World Health Organization or WHO respectively). Based on the latest available estimates, 
only 3/16 countries (Botswana, Eswatini and Lesotho) spent at least 20 per cent of their 
national budgets on education, thereby meeting their financial commitment to the Incheon 
Declaration and SDG 4 to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote 
lifelong learning opportunities for all”12 (Figure 2.06: blue bars). Performance on the health 
front is equally discouraging, as just 2/16 countries (Eswatini and Malawi) recently devoted 
at least 15 per cent of their national budget to health in line with the Abuja Declaration 
spending target (Figure 2.06: red bars).13 Here, the main takeaway is that the budget priority 
given to core human capital sectors varies widely across the sample but almost always 
falls below international targets.
Turning to country-level information, expenditure on nationally-defined human capital 
sectors rose over the historical period reviewed in only five countries. In Zambia, 
10   Note: Social protection is used as a categorial term, but the sector definition varies by country (e.g. social 
development, social welfare).
11   Comoros was the only exception, where education and health were defined as priority expenditure.
12  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2015). Incheon Declaration and SDG4 – 
Education 2030 Framework for Action. Paris: UNESCO, page 9.
13  World Health Organization (WHO) (2011). The Abuja Declaration: Ten Years On.
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Figure 2.05. Budget classification systems used
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Figure 2.04. Definitions of priority or human capital expenditure
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expenditure increased both as a percentage of GDP and in per child terms. In South Africa, 
even though the economy grew very modestly in recent years, education and health 
expenditure were relatively protected, with expenditure on human capital increasing 
in terms of GDP. In Lesotho, in line with the government’s commitment to improving 
education, health and social development, human capital expenditure similarly rose 
despite economic headwinds. Similarly, in Eswatini, driven by broader expansionary fiscal 
policy, expenditure on education and health consistently increased since FY2011/12. And in 
Madagascar, government expenditure on human capital sectors increased since FY2013, 
albeit minimally. 
In six countries, expenditure on core human capital sectors was kept at a stable level 
over the period examined. In Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, human capital 
expenditure remained relatively steady in terms of GDP, with per child expenditure showing 
a small increase. In Botswana, human capital expenditure was roughly constant between 
FY2011 and FY2017 in terms of GDP and on a per child basis, but also emerged as one of 
the highest levels among the sample (around 11 per cent of GDP, on average). Namibia 
recorded an even higher commitment, with human capital expenditure fluctuating around 
12 per cent of GDP. In contrast, Uganda’s expenditure on human capital was relatively 
steady at 3.6 per cent of GDP, which was among the lower levels in the sample. And in 
Malawi, off-donor budget support complemented government expenditure, allowing 
expenditure on human capital to hover around 8 per cent of GDP.
Four countries experienced declines in human capital expenditure during the historical 
period, which was largely due to political and economic shocks. Burundi was characterized 
by low levels of expenditure, especially on social protection, which decreased in real terms 
between 2013 and 2015 and is among the lowest in Africa. This trend reflects not only the 
extraordinary depth of impoverishment in the country, but years of internal conflict that 
Figure 2.06. Government expenditure on education and health, 2017 or latest available 
(as % of total expenditure)
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prevented successive governments from effectively providing for the basic needs of the 
population. Angola was also marked by a big drop in human capital expenditure between 
2013 and 2017, which fell more than 66 per cent in real terms. Much of this was a result of 
the fall in oil prices and the negative impact on revenue, with social protection bearing 
the brunt of the cuts (expenditure declined from 19 per cent of total expenditure in 2013 
to 10 per cent in 2017). In the case of Mozambique, expenditure on human capital slightly 
contracted from around 12 to 11 per cent of GDP between 2015 and 2017 but declined nearly 
20 per cent in real terms. This was due to both negative economic growth and escalating 
debt service payments, which consumed more than 20 per cent of total expenditure. And in 
Comoros, expenditure on human capital fell between 2014 and 2016, both as a percentage 
of total expenditure (from 30 per cent to 25 per cent) and in real per child terms (by close 
to 20 per cent).
Lastly, one country – Rwanda – was marked by wide expenditure fluctuations over the 
historical period. Here, the priority given to core human capital sectors declined from 25.2 
to 23.7 per cent of total expenditure between FY2011-12 and FY2012-13. The trend then 
steadily reversed, with expenditure reaching 26.8 per cent of total expenditure on FY2015-
16 before falling in FY2016-17 to 24.5 per cent. Similar movements were also observed 
when looking at human capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which could partially 
be explained by the strong focus on economic growth and investment in productive 
sectors.
2.4.3. Human capital expenditure challenges
Considering the generally poor state of social indicators and the ambitions expressed 
in national development plans, most countries spend inadequately on human capital. 
Among the main sectors examined, education accounts for the largest share of government 
investment, with health and especially social protection receiving significantly less 
funding. One common issue is that sector strategies and action plans are designed on 
the assumption that a certain level of allocations will be received, while actual funding 
commitments fall short of expectations. In the United Republic of Tanzania, for example, 
despite the existence of costed multi-sector national action plans and government funding 
pledges, very large gaps are observed in the budgets for health and social protection. Or 
in Uganda, the National Development Plan emphasizes human capital development as one 
of its priorities, but this is not sufficiently reflected in budget allocations. 
To realize ambitious development plans and to cope with the growing demand for 
services due to demographic forces, there is a clear need for more investment in human 
capital sectors. As described in the previous section, most of the countries studied did not 
experience a steady increase in human capital expenditure, especially in real per capita 
terms. Recent investment trends therefore indicate that the rapid and large scaling up of 
basic programmes to develop human capital, especially health and social protection, will 
not be realized in most countries anytime soon. For instance, the introduction of a single-
payer health care system in South Africa requires a substantial increase of resources 
for the health sector, while expanding the coverage and/or benefits of social assistance 
programmes – which are already among the largest in the world – will equally require 
massive amounts of fiscal space. Or in Uganda, a recent social protection investment 
case identified severe financial gaps when comparing recent investment trends with cost 
estimates for progressively expanding different schemes.14
Beyond the obvious funding shortages, the country studies also shed light on some 
of the key challenges related to spending resources that have been released to human 
14  UNICEF Uganda (2017). Social Protection Investment Case.
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Figure 2.07. Common expenditure challenges in human capital sectors (# of countries)
capital sectors. Although a variety of issues were documented in the country studies, this 
section focuses on the four most prevalent (Figure 2.07). Budget execution emerged as the 
foremost challenge, severely affecting at least 11/16 countries examined. The withdrawal 
of donor support, low financial capacity and the poor design of human capital budgets 
are other recurring challenges, each of which was identified in roughly half of the studies. 
These issues are discussed below.
Weak budget execution was identified as the primary expenditure challenge in human 
capital sectors, which affected nearly all countries studied. The country studies confirmed 
well-documented findings from the broader literature on PFM15 that the primary budget 
execution bottlenecks are in capital (or development) budgets. This was also found to apply 
equally to both domestic and external funding sources. This makes sense intuitively given 
that expenditure on recurrent items, like salaries, tends to be straightforward and is often 
automated. When looking at capital budgets, however, many of the spending challenges 
are associated with the ongoing move toward decentralization. Specifically, where service 
delivery has been delegated to lower administrative levels, there is often insufficient 
human capacity to plan and manage resources; weak controls and information systems 
present additional bottlenecks. Procurement can also be problematic, with cumbersome 
processes and a limited supply of qualified service providers making contracting difficult 
in many places.
Another frequent spending challenge was linked to the withdrawal of donor support. 
In most of the countries studied, development partners (DPs) contribute a large share 
15  Cangiano, M., Curristine, T. and Lazare, M. (2013). PFM and Its Emerging Architecture. Washington, DC: IMF.
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of capital expenditure on human capital sectors, especially in capital-intense sectors 
like WASH. This high level of support can lead to an overdependence on donors, which 
pushes the government to withdraw from certain sectors. DPs in Malawi, for example, 
have played an important role in financing human capital sectors, but this has affected 
the government’s priority setting i.e. raising the share of the national budget for health 
is not urgent as long as donors are footing most of the bill. This may even be more acute 
in Comoros, where service delivery in human capital sectors is almost fully financed by 
donors, apart from salaries. At the same time, where donor support is provided off-budget, 
budget planning processes can be undermined while also running a high risk of services 
being duplicated and hence causing wastage.
Although partially captured above, low financial capacity was also commonly noted as a 
spending bottleneck. Perhaps this is most evident in decentralized spending units, which 
usually receive funding based on a nationally-defined allocation formula. Insufficient 
strength of local governments to stand up to decreasing transfers as well as continued 
concerns about PFM capacity make them easy targets for cutting or at least not increasing 
human capital budgets.
Another overarching challenge was allocative inefficiencies within human capital budgets. 
Not all countries spend their available resources in a manner that supports human capital 
or equity. For example, many governments devote a large share of their education and 
health budgets to tertiary services (e.g. universities or hospitals in urban locations), which 
have limited benefits for the most vulnerable populations. Botswana is a case in point, 
where, despite high and increasing human capital expenditure in recent years, over-
investment in expensive tertiary education and curative healthcare services comes at the 
expense of under-investment in primary services. Similarly, social protection budgets are 
often consumed by subsidies that do not directly benefit the neediest populations, such 
as agricultural subsidies in Malawi or fuel subsides in Angola, Mozambique, the United 
Republic of Tanzania or Zambia. The geographical equity of spending is another concern, 
as rural areas frequently receive far fewer resources on a per capita basis.
One intra-sectoral allocation constraint is the absence of costed sector plans. This leads 
to inadequate prioritization and unrealistic financial planning in budget preparation, as 
line ministries sometimes have inadequate insight into the costs of the policies they are 
supposed to implement. The appearance of unexpected costs can also lead to ad hoc 
budget execution and inefficient spending patterns. Lastly, this affects sector outcomes 
as financially pressured sectors tend to budget inadequately for maintenance costs, most 
notably in the WASH sector. 
Improved financial planning would further facilitate a better balance between recurrent 
and capital expenditure and deliver better value for money. In some countries, spending 
on wages crowds out needed investment in capital items. In Madagascar, for example, 
where the quality of education is low and investment in education is essential, salaries 
consume around 90 per cent of the budget; a similar situation is observed in Comoros. 
Beyond the design of budgets, inefficient human resource management also contributes 
to substantial wastage and poor outcomes in human capital sectors. For example, in South 
Africa specific areas of mismanagement relate to provinces employing more teachers than 
they can afford, the hiring of unqualified teachers and placing teachers in schools where 
they are not needed at the expense of schools where there are shortages.
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2.5 The outlook for human capital expenditure
Before discussing different fiscal space options, it is first important to understand how 
investment in human capital may evolve if following a business-as-usual pathway. In each 
macro-fiscal programming model, a projection analysis was first carried out using a non-
controversial set of assumptions to assess the likely growth of human capital investments 
over the future periods studied. 
Although each model was unique, it was possible to standardize some of the features 
to allow for cross-country analysis of the human capital expenditure projections. This 
required introducing various configurations into each model, including re-defining human 
capital expenditure (education, health, social protection) and the age range of the child 
population (under 18), as well as re-setting the base values (average of latest two years of 
actual information) and end values (projection year 5). After the standardization process, 
the baseline and endline values for per child expenditure on human capital sectors 
were recalculated, still reflecting the original assumptions built into each model. A full 
description of the steps performed, as well as a summary of the differences between the 
original and adjusted models, is provided in Annex 2. Despite these changes, there are 
still notable issues that limit the accuracy of cross-country comparisons. These include 
different projection years, different base years for CPI and exchange rate conversions, 
and different definitions of human capital expenditure. Caveats aside, this approach does 
allow for a very broad picture of how expenditure on core human capital sectors could 
potentially evolve in the 16 countries, all other things equal.
When reviewing the expenditure projections across the 16 countries, the regional outlook 
for human capital investments is mixed. Based on the modified macro-fiscal programming 
models, the level of investment in human capital on a per child basis is projected to decline 
from US$412 (in constant US$ using country-specific base years) to US$386, on average, 
when comparing the baseline values with the predicted values five years into the future 
(Figure 2.08). This amounts to a real decline in per child expenditure of approximately 6 
per cent as a sample average. The picture does become more optimistic if looking at the 
median value of the sample, which captures the performance of the 50th percentile. Under 
this measure, real per child expenditure is projected to rise from US$137 to US$181 over a 
five-year horizon, on average, which amounts to a real increase of more than 30 per cent.
As indicated by the differences between the average and median values in the sample, 
there are significant variations across countries. Eight countries are projected to experience 
a decline in real per child expenditure on human capital sectors after a five-year period. 
This includes Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, which are projected to experience a 
minimal decline at around 3 per cent on average, along with Burundi, Eswatini, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, where per child expenditure is predicted 
to fall by an average of 17 per cent. Much of this can be attributed to the sluggish or 
negative economic growth outlooks, which are expected to limit government revenue 
and hence investment capacity. While Malawi and Uganda are projected to experience a 
minimal increase in real per child expenditure over a five-year horizon (both at 2 per cent), 
the other six countries show strong potential. Per child expenditure on human capital 
could increase by 20 per cent or more in real terms in Comoros and Madagascar, by more 
than 30 per cent in Rwanda, 50 per cent in the United Republic of Tanzania, close to 70 per 
cent in Kenya and 90 per cent in Angola. In the latter case, the eye-popping potential is not 
the result of an economic growth spurt far beyond what was projected in Section 2.3, but 
rather the government’s recent commitment to aggressively increase the budget priority 
given to the education and health sectors in line with international spending targets by 
2022. 
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The information on human capital expenditure projections presented above is critical for 
understanding the following the discussions. The results of different alternative scenarios 
will be weighed against their ability to improve on the results from the baseline scenarios.
Figure 2.08. Change in human capital investments after a five-year period based on the 
baseline scenarios (in per child constant US$ and as %)
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2.6 Options to expand fiscal space in 16 ESAR countries
This section discusses the main options for maximizing fiscal space to facilitate greater 
investment in core human capital sectors. Based on information and projections from 
global databases, it first provides a regional picture of each option to highlight overall 
trends and possible opportunities. This is then complemented by the quantitative findings 
from the macro-fiscal programming models from the 16 countries. 
To allow for a reasonable comparison of results across countries, the alternative scenarios 
developed in each model had to be adjusted. One of the main issues was that the additional 
fiscal space generated by the alternative scenarios in the country models was not exclusively 
used to increase human capital expenditure. On the contrary, it was often directed to debt 
repayment or to greater expenditure on other areas, whereby only a portion – or sometimes 
nothing at all – would benefit human capital expenditure. The models were therefore adjusted 
so that it was possible to isolate the full impact of an alternative scenario on human capital 
expenditure.16 As a result, the findings in this report may differ from those presented in the 
country reports. A complete description of the methodology used to adjust the alternative 
scenario results from the country models is provided in Annex 2.
2.6.1. Increasing government revenue
Natural revenue growth is the easiest way to progressively increase expenditure on core 
human capital sectors over time. When looking at the average values across the countries 
studied, general government revenue projections from the IMF indicate that revenue 
growth will slow from a recent peak of 14 per cent in 2017 to around 10 per cent over the 
2019-21 period (Figure 2.09). As presented in Section 2.3, this reflects the strong economic 
growth outlooks over the near term in most countries. However, once factoring in price 
and demographic changes, the outlook is much more modest, with real per capita revenue 
growth expected to average only about 1.4 per cent per year between 2019 and 2021.
IMF projections indicate that all countries are likely to benefit from greater revenue flows 
to support human capital sectors, but the impacts of larger budgets will be muted due 
to rising prices and larger populations. If all other things are held constant, including the 
sectoral composition of budgets and spending performance, available funding for human 
capital sectors would be expected to increase by an average of about 10 per cent annually 
over the near term across the 16 countries. But taking an additional step to look at the 
impact, bigger budgets will only minimally increase the amount of goods and services 
that can be delivered at higher costs to larger populations. Over the 2019-21 period, the 
difference between the average annual growth of nominal and real per capita revenue is 
more than 8 per cent, on average (10.2 versus 1.9 per cent respectively).
Significant differences in total revenue growth potential are observed across the countries. 
Among the poorer performers, Botswana, Comoros and Eswatini are projected to 
experience 5-7 per cent growth in nominal terms during the 2019-21 period (Figure 2.10). In 
contrast, nominal revenue in Angola, Malawi, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania 
is projected to increase by 13 per cent or more each year over the same period. But just 
as in the regional analysis, growth becomes much lower – or even negative – for most 
countries once accounting for changing price levels and population sizes. Under the real 
per capita lens, four countries (Burundi, Eswatini, Mozambique and Zambia) are projected 
to experience negative growth, meaning that, if all other things are held constant, they will 
be able to provide fewer goods and services that foster human capital. On the other hand, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania will still be able to deliver much more with 
16  These changes built on those introduced into the baseline scenarios as summarized in Section 2.5.
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Figure 2.09.  Nominal and real per capita general government revenue, 2019-21 (as %, 
average of 16 countries)
15.1
18.8
15.3
8.3
6.0 5.4
14.0
10.4
9.2
10.3 10.2
3.3
6.2
5.4
-0.2
-2.4
-5.7
2.5
1.8
0.5
1.9 1.9
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Nominal growth Real, per capita growth
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018).
Figure 2.10. Nominal and real per capita general government revenue trends, 2019-21 
period average projections (annual average percentage change)
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their human capital budgets, which are projected to grow 5-6 per cent annually in real per 
capita terms over the 2019-21 period. 
If breaking down overall revenue flows, a prominent option for increasing expenditure on 
human capital sectors is greater tax collection. This could result from any combination of 
introducing new taxes, increasing current rates, reducing exemptions, and/or strengthening 
compliance and enforcement. In the group of countries studied, the ability of governments 
to extract taxes from the economy has wavered and trended downward in recent years 
(Figure 2.11a). As a sample average, total tax collection reached over 24 per cent of GDP in 
2012, but has since steadily declined, falling below 20 per cent in 2016, the latest year with 
comparable data for most countries.
At the country level, there is a wide variance of tax collection capacity. Largely due to 
transfers received from the Southern African Customs Union, tax revenue in Eswatini, 
Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa has recently averaged near or above 30 per cent of GDP 
(Figure 2.11b). In contrast, tax revenue has been closer to 10 per cent of GDP in countries 
like Angola, Burundi, Madagascar and the United Republic of Tanzania.
The country studies confirm the opportunities presented by natural revenue growth and 
improved tax collection efforts. While the revenue generated from economic growth (or lack 
thereof) was one of the main determinants of the projected changes in per child expenditure 
on human capital as earlier shown in Figure 2.08, strong potential is also demonstrated by 
the alternative scenarios. All 16 studies looked at the possibility of different tax approaches 
to enhance funding. These included strengthening the efficiency of collection efforts and/or 
of increasing the rates of value added tax (VAT) on domestic products (13 countries17), VAT 
on imports (9 countries18), corporate income taxes (CITs) (7 countries19), personal income 
taxes (PITs) (5 countries20), alcohol and tobacco taxes (2 countries21), fuel taxes (1 country22) 
and mining royalties (1 country23) as well as increasing the efficiency of tax collection at 
subnational levels (1 country24) and overall tax administrative capacity (1 country25). In 
total, 24 taxation scenarios were modelled,26 although most scenarios combined multiple 
approaches (e.g. improving domestic and import VAT along with increasing CIT rates). 
The modelling results indicate that taxes are a strong channel to boost human capital 
investment. If taking the most promising tax scenario from each of the 16 country studies 
and directing all new resources to human capital sectors, per child expenditure could 
increase by an average of around US$23 above the baseline scenario after five years, 
which amounts to a 10 per cent improvement in real terms (Figure 2.12). For instance, 
a combination of approaches in Malawi, including gradually enhancing the efficiency of 
VAT, PIT and CIT collection by 50 per cent over the projection period, could raise real per 
child expenditure on human capital by more than 30 per cent above the baseline scenario. 
Elsewhere, improving tax collection capacity at the county level in Kenya could increase 
real per child expenditure by 16 per cent, while minimally raising the tax rates on alcohol 
and tobacco products in Lesotho – from 15 to 19 per cent – could generate a 2 per cent real 
increase in per child expenditure.
17  In Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, 
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
18  In Comoros, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
19  In Botswana, Eswatini, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa.
20  In Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi and Namibia.
21  In Eswatini and Lesotho.
22  In Eswatini.
23  In Madagascar.
24  In Kenya.
25  In Burundi.
26  Six countries included multiple alternative scenarios on taxes. 
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Figure 2.11. Tax revenue trends (as % of GDP)
Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank GDP estimates.
Note: Comprehensive comparable data for this indicator is not available for all countries and all years, thus this average ignores specific 
countries in some years.
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2.6.2. Increasing ODA
ODA flows to the 16 countries have grown modestly since 2014 but are expected to 
slightly decline on a per capita basis over the near term. After peaking in 2013 at US$16.2 
billion (in constant 2015 US$) or around US$50 per recipient, the total amount of grants 
and concessional financing fell to US$13.7 billion or US$41 per capita in 2014 (Figure 
2.13). From then, the volume of ODA rebounded and increased by around US$600 million 
annually until 2017, reaching US$15.4 billion or about US$43 on a per person basis. Looking 
forward, simple projections suggest that the recent upward trend could be maintained 
through 2021 with total ODA flows to the 16 countries in the US$16-17 billion range. While 
this would represent an increase of close to 10 per cent from 2017 levels in aggregate 
numbers, per capital levels would remain constant.
At the country level, the impact of ODA on human capital expenditure is expected to vary 
over the near term. Looking at the 16 countries studied, simple projections indicate that 
the scale of support over the 2019-21 period will increase by an average of around US$8 a 
year on a per recipient basis (in constant 2015 US$), relative to the 2016-18 period (Figure 
2.14). However, foreign aid is expected to decline in about half of the sample, including 
Angola, Burundi, Mozambique and South Africa (US$5-11 average annual decreases in per 
capita terms). In other contexts, ODA flows may rise. For instance, when comparing 2016-
18 and 2019-21, per capita ODA could increase by as much as US$30 in Malawi and US$40 
in Eswatini and Lesotho. 
The modelling exercises confirm that ODA provides a good opportunity to boost human 
capital investments in some countries. In the regional context of declining or stagnating 
flows on a per recipient basis, just six of the 16 country studies incorporated this type of 
alternative scenario, including most LICs along with one LMIC (Angola). Based on this 
Figure 2.12. Potential additional impact of new tax revenue on human capital 
investments after a five-year projection period compared to the baseline scenario (in per 
child constant US$ and as %)
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Figure 2.13. Net ODA and official aid trends, 2000-21 (in billions and per capita constant 
2015 US$, total and average of 16 countries)
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Figure 2.14. Trends in net ODA and official aid per capita, 2016-18 and 2019-21 period 
averages (in constant 2015 US$)
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sample, efforts to attract more ODA for human capital sectors could increase per child 
expenditure by an average of US$19, or an 18 per cent real increase above the projected 
baseline values after five years (Figure 2.15). Of all the alternative scenarios, one from 
Mozambique showed the greatest promise. If the government could successfully lobby for 
an increase of external grants by 20 per cent over a five-year period, per child expenditure 
on human capital be more than 30 per cent greater than the baseline scenario level in real 
terms. In Burundi and Madagascar, a larger than expected volume of external grants could 
see per child expenditure rise by around 25 per cent above the baseline scenario in real 
terms after five years. And in Malawi, if external grants reached 4 per cent of GDP at the 
end of the projection period rather than 3.4 per cent of GDP under the baseline scenario, 
real per child expenditure could be around 8 per cent higher.
2.6.3. Reprioritizing spending 
A seemingly easy yet politically complex way to increase investment in human capital 
sectors is to shift the orientation of the national budget. Some of the most commonly 
cited examples are reallocating resources away from non-priority sectors, such as national 
defence, or from subsidies that distort the economy (e.g. for state-owned enterprises) or have 
regressive impacts (e.g. fuel subsidies, which mainly benefit the wealthiest populations). 
In practice, the potential for reprioritization depends on a variety of circumstances in each 
country, especially politics. And while it is challenging to obtain cross-country comparable 
information to pinpoint specific opportunities, recent data on military expenditures offers 
one such lens. This is considered a decent illustration since only 3 out of 16 countries 
studied (Burundi, Kenya and Uganda) have been directly involved in a conflict in the past 
Figure 2.15.  Potential additional impact of increased ODA on human capital investments 
after a five-year projection period compared to the baseline scenario (in per child 
constant US$ and as %)
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Figure 2.16. The impact of reallocating 50% of military expenditure to education, 
2017 (or latest available) (as % of total expenditure)
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Figure 2.17. The impact of reallocating 50% of military expenditure to health, 2017 (or 
latest available) (as % of total expenditure)
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ten years or face an imminent external threat,27 which makes it difficult to rationalize large 
military budgets in most contexts. 
By reallocating 50 per cent of recent military budgets, most governments in the sample 
could easily achieve core human capital spending benchmarks. The impact can be observed 
by comparing the change to expenditure on education and health as shown earlier in Figure 
2.06. For instance, if half of military expenditure had been redirected to the education 
sector in 2017, education as a share of total expenditure would have increased from 15.9 
to 19.2 per cent, on average, which means that eight countries would have fulfilled their 
commitment to the Incheon Declaration, up from three (Figure 2.16). Applying the same 
approach to health shows that 10 countries would have achieved the Abuja Declaration 
target, up from 2, with health expenditure rising from 11.7 to 15 per cent of total expenditure 
(Figure 2.17). Of course, the effects would be much more pronounced if the entire military 
budget were reallocated, whereby 10 countries would meet the education target and 13 
the health target.
The country modelling exercises also validate the hypothesis that reprioritization could be 
a very robust option to scale up human capital investments in many countries. Of the eight 
studies that included this type of alternative scenario, expenditure levels were predicted to 
be US$88 per child higher than the baseline scenario after a five-year period, on average, or 
a 28 per cent increase in real terms (Figure 2.18). If the Government of Rwanda was able to 
encourage greater funding from the private sector to support its ambitious infrastructure 
projects and progressively shift those projected public resources to human capital sectors, 
per child expenditure could more than double in real terms when compared to the 
predicted levels of expenditure under the baseline scenario after five years. In Lesotho, 
27 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1. Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
Figure 2.18. Potential additional impact of budget reprioritization on human capital 
investments after a five-year projection period compared to the baseline scenario
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a combination of progressively eliminating fuel subsidies and retraining and redeploying 
security personnel to work in human capital sectors could raise real per child expenditure 
levels 5 per cent higher than the baseline scenario after five years. And in Comoros and 
Eswatini, reallocating resources from defence and public administration to human capital 
sectors could lift per child expenditure 40 per cent and 20 per cent respectively above the 
projected baseline levels after a five-year period.
2.6.4. Improving the efficiency of spending
A major opportunity for many governments to increase investment in human capital 
sectors is to ensure that available resources are actually spent. One way to measure 
spending efficiency is through budget execution rates, which show the difference between 
the amount of resources released to a spending agency during a fiscal year and the amount 
of resources that are used by the end of that year. If the budget execution rate is less than 
100 per cent, this means all of the funds that were made available during the year were not 
spent. In many cases, unutilized funds are given to other ministries that can readily spend 
the resources before the end of the fiscal year or, alternatively, returned to the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) or Treasury. In either case, resources that were available in a human 
capital sector are, in effect, “lost.” As a result, improving budget execution performance 
can directly boost investment levels.
Data on budget execution is not systematically collected and reported in global databases, 
which limits this type of analysis. A select number of studies do provide data points, 
but this does not allow for comprehensive analysis. In contrast, budget credibility rates – 
which show the variance between the approved budget at the start of the fiscal year and 
the amount of resources spent by the end of the year – are more widely captured. Although 
these indicators are fundamentally different – i.e. a ministerial budget can have a very low 
budget credibility rate alongside a very high budget execution rate – poor performance in 
one area tends to be associated with poor performance in the other, especially over time. 
This is at least partially driven by the similarity of underlying challenges, which can range 
from weak budget planning and human resources capacity to delayed disbursement flows, 
poor cash management practices, complex procurement processes and so on. Thus, while 
budget credibility is an imperfect measure of the amount of available resources that may 
be “lost” each year due to certain spending inefficiencies, it can serve as an acceptable 
proxy for illustrative purposes.
Budget credibility trends suggest that most countries studied show strong potential 
to increase actual investment in human capital areas. A review of different public 
finance analyses, including UNICEF budget briefs, Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reports and World Bank BOOST 
databases, provides at least some information for all 16 countries on the education and 
health sectors. The data vary by country, covering a mix of credibility rates for recurrent, 
capital and overall expenditure, as well as across different fiscal years. Nonetheless, when 
looking at the latest three-year average of available data points for each country, 94 per 
cent of the approved amount of education budgets is spent by the end of the fiscal year, 
as a regional average (Figure 2.19). Recurrent expenditure performs much better (99 per 
cent on average) than capital expenditure (67 per cent on average), but notable differences 
are observed across countries. For instance, the latest three-year average credibility rate 
for the recurrent education budget was 81 per cent in Lesotho compared to 107 per cent 
in the United Republic of Tanzania, while for capital budgets it was 34 per cent in Lesotho 
and 95 per cent in Namibia. Turning to the health sector, credibility trends are remarkably 
similar. Specifically, the latest three-year average recurrent and capital budget credibility 
rates were 94 and 65 per cent respectively, with the overall rate at 85 per cent on average 
(Figure 2.20).
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Figure 2.19. Education budget credibility rates, latest available 3-year period averages 
(actual expenditure as % of approved allocation) 
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Figure 2.20. Health budget credibility rates, latest available 3-year period averages 
(actual expenditure as % of approved allocation)
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The application of a simplified model can enable estimation of the volume of human capital 
resources “lost” due to underspending. For example, aligning total budget credibility 
rates to education and health expenditure data in the same fiscal years makes it possible 
to calculate the additional volume of resources that could have been spent had budget 
credibility rates reached 100 per cent in each sector. The caveats of this methodology are 
significant and underlined by the use of budget credibility rather than execution data, which 
erroneously assumes the rates to be identical. Nonetheless, bearing the assumptions and 
data limitations in mind, this approach does offer a very preliminary picture of “lost” fiscal 
space.
A very rough approximation is that billions of dollars of available human capital resources 
are “lost” each year due to certain spending inefficiencies. Among the 14 countries that 
have data on overall budget credibility rates for the education and health sectors in recent 
years, the combined “lost” amount of these core human capital resources exceeded US$8 
billion annually (in purchasing power parity or PPP, current international $) (Figure 2.21a). 
To get a better sense of the magnitude of potential loss, this would equal more than 55 
per cent of the entire annual ODA flows to those 14 countries. At the country level, this 
is somewhere around US$200 million a year in Malawi and Rwanda, US$400 million in 
Lesotho and Madagascar, US$500 million in Mozambique, US$1 billion in South Africa and 
Uganda, US$1.6 billion in the United Republic of Tanzania and US$2.7 billion in Kenya. In 
per capita terms, nearly US$30 per capita (in PPP, current international $) of human capital 
investments were “lost” as a sample average, which reaches more than US$60 per capita 
in Kenya and nearly US$200 per person in Lesotho (Figure 2.21b). 
The limited information from the country studies validates the prospects suggested by the 
regional trends. As earlier described, the difficulties in obtaining data on budget execution 
prevented a more comprehensive assessment of this option, which was discussed in 
nearly all studies but only modelled in three countries. A review of this limited sample 
indicates that efforts to strengthen budget execution rates in human capital sectors could 
potentially increase per child expenditure by an average of US$22 (in constant US$), above 
the baseline projections after five years or around a 10 per cent increase in real terms 
(Figure 2.22). 
Although limited, the available modelling exercises illustrate the potential gains from 
addressing budget execution weaknesses. In Kenya, if budget execution rates progressively 
reached 100 per cent in the education and health sectors rather than continuing at the 
90 per cent in the baseline scenario, per child expenditure could be more than 20 per 
cent higher in real terms after five years (also Figure 2.22). In Burundi, an alternative 
scenario looked at improving budget execution rates in the education sector above the 
baseline scenario, from 70 to 80 per cent for recurrent spending and from 50 to 65 per 
cent for capital spending. With these relatively modest ambitions, it is estimated that after 
a five-year period, real per child expenditure could increase by more than 10 per cent. 
And in Eswatini, as recurrent spending performed strong across the board, an alternative 
scenario focused on strengthening capital budget execution rates in the education, health 
and social welfare sectors. Here, doubling execution rates beyond those in the baseline 
scenario was projected to produce an additional US$16 per child after five years, or a 3 per 
cent overall increase in real terms.
Beyond budget execution, another type of spending inefficiency is wastage, which may 
also present opportunities to enhance the impact of resources already released to human 
capital sectors. Wastage can occur when services or benefits are provided multiple times 
to the same person (contrary to rules) or to persons who are ineligible to receive them. 
Given the parameters and the short duration of the in-country work, this issue was difficult 
to reveal in most studies. However, Lesotho did offer some insights. There, both categories 
of wastage were identified in the social protection sector. On the one hand, registration 
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Figure 2.21. Crude estimates of “lost” education and health resources, 
latest available three-year period averages (in PPP, current international US$)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on total budget credibility rates for the education and health sectors (see Figures 2.16 and 2.17 for 
information on sources), education expenditure data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, health expenditure data from WHO Global 
Health Expenditure Database, GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018), and population data from UN 
DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates).
Note: Botswana and Eswatini were excluded since they did not have total budget credibility rates for the education or health sectors. 
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challenges have resulted in a situation where many beneficiaries receive cash grants 
from multiple programmes, which is contrary to the design of the system. On the other 
hand, the number of citizens that receive old-age pensions is around 30,000 more than 
the actual number of elderly persons living in the country, which results when payments 
continue after the death of the recipients. By applying a simple estimation approach to the 
latter spending inefficiency, the Lesotho fiscal space analysis indicated that eliminating 
the “ghost” pensioners and redirecting those resources to child grants would allow the 
programme to cover nearly all children in the country, up from less than 20 per cent.
2.6.5. Borrowing and debt restructuring
Budget deficits have been the norm in recent years in the countries reviewed and are 
expected to continue over the near term. All governments have spent far beyond their 
income in recent years, amounting to 5 per cent of GDP as a period average for the 
sample (Figure 2.23). This trend is projected to continue over the 2019-21 period, meaning 
that governments are expected to run budget deficits and borrow from domestic and 
international markets to pay for the difference. 
One primary concern is that structural budget deficits have caused government debt to 
soar across the sample. As a regional average, general government gross debt increased 
sharply in recent years, from around 30 per cent of GDP in 2012 to more than 50 per cent 
in 2018 (Figure 2.24). Over this period, debt levels increased by around 20 per cent of 
GDP in Eswatini, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda, by around 50 per cent of GDP in Angola 
and Zambia, and by nearly 75 per cent of GDP in Mozambique. There are, however, two 
outliers: debt levels fell in Botswana and Comoros by around 6 per cent and 14 per cent 
of GDP respectively. Looking forward, general government gross debt is projected to 
Figure 2.22. Potential additional impact of higher capital budget execution rates on 
actual human capital investment after a five-year projection period compared to the 
baseline scenario (in per child constant US$ and as %)
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Source: Author’s calculations based on modifications to country macro-fiscal programming models (see Annex 2). 
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average 54 per cent over the 2019-21 period. Here, debt levels are expected to increase by 
an average of 5.8 per cent of GDP in 11 countries and to decrease by an average of 3.6 per 
cent of GDP in five countries. Debt is forecast to increase by 11 per cent or more of GDP in 
Burundi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia during the 2019-21 period and fall by about 
11 per cent of GDP in Angola.
Nonetheless, in some cases governments may have flexibility to borrow over the near term 
to support investment in human capital. The most obvious cases are the LICs in the sample 
that are considered to have a low risk of debt distress, which include Lesotho, Rwanda, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (Figure 2.25). If looking further at core debt 
distress indicators, these countries demonstrate additional borrowing capacity, especially 
from external sources. The IMF’s latest debt sustainability framework for LICs28 updated its 
approach for assessing debt distress, which included the creation of a Composite Index (CI) 
that goes beyond the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to assess borrowing 
capacity, as well as adjusting benchmark levels for different indicators. Since the Fund had 
not yet released a database of CI values at the time of writing, applying the latest CPIA 
values as a proxy for borrowing capacity and looking at the corresponding debt distress 
thresholds for two key indicators – the present value of debt as a percentage of GDP and 
as a percentage of exports – suggests that all countries except Mozambique have external 
debt loads far below the thresholds (Figures 2.26 and 2.27). Here, the obvious limitation is 
that external debt constitutes only a small proportion of debt in most countries, which have 
principally relied on domestic markets to meet borrowing needs. This landscape, however, 
could change quickly for some countries, especially as they reach middle-income status and/
or maintain strong economic growth outlooks. 
Another potential opportunity for some governments is to lower debt servicing costs, 
which would allow for those resources to be redirected to support greater spending on 
human capital sectors. By meeting with creditors, governments could restructure their 
current debt obligations, either by refinancing on more favourable terms or by negotiating 
lower interest rates and/or later maturity dates. Voluntary negotiations have been quite 
common, with more than 60 governments successfully restructuring debt between 1990 
and the early 2000s.29
Turning to the modelling exercises, there was evidence of some potential for borrowing to 
fund greater human capital investments among a small group of countries. Looking at the 
four countries that included this alternative scenario, different borrowing arrangements 
could increase funding for human capital sectors by an average of around US$10 per child 
above the amount projected in the baseline scenario after five years, or a 14 per cent real 
increase (Figure 2.28). In Malawi, if external debt disbursements remained stable at 3 per 
cent of GDP rather than falling to 2.5 per cent of GDP under the baseline scenario, per child 
expenditure was estimated to be nearly 40 per cent higher in real terms after five years. In 
Comoros, a non-concessional loan to support investment in the health sector, including to 
construct a new hospital, was projected to improve real per child expenditure by close to 
10 per cent above the baseline scenario after five years. And if domestic financing reached 
0.2 and 0.15 per cent of GDP higher than the baseline scenarios in Uganda and the United 
Republic of Tanzania respectively, with the loan proceeds fully directed to human capital 
sectors, per child expenditure could rise by 7 and 2 per cent in real terms respectively. As 
a final note, re-negotiating debt repayment terms was discussed in many country studies, 
but this option was never modelled.
28  International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2017). Review of the Debt Sustainability Framework in Low-Income Countries: 
Proposed Reforms. IMF Policy Paper.
29  Bai, Y. and Zhangy, J. (2010). Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation. University of Michigan Working Paper No. 
593.
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Figure 2.23. General government net borrowing, 2016-18 and 2019-21 period averages (as 
% of GDP)
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018).
Figure 2.24. General government gross debt, 2012, 2018 and 2019-21 period average (as % 
of GDP)
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Figure 2.25. Risk of debt distress, latest available
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Source: IMF (2018) “List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-Eligible Countries,” Summary note based on a staff review of the latest DSAs as of 1 
November 2018.
Note: DSAs have not recently been conducted in Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Namibia or South Africa.
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Figure 2.26. Present value of external debt and debt distress, 2017 (as % of GDP)
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Figure 2.27.Present value of external debt and debt distress thresholds in the 16 fiscal 
space countries, 2017 (as % of exports of goods, services and primary income)
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2.6.6. Using fiscal savings
Several governments have fiscal savings invested in sovereign wealth funds that could 
be immediately accessed to finance greater spending on human capital sectors. Of the 16 
countries studied, two currently have commodity-based sovereign wealth funds, which 
are state-owned investment funds designed to maximize financial returns, typically in 
international capital markets, as well as to sterilize foreign currency inflows to avoid 
appreciation of the national currency. This includes Angola, which has an estimated 
US$4.6 billion of oil earnings stored in the Fondo Soberano de Angola (launched in 2012), 
and Botswana, which has around US$5.5 billion of diamond revenue in the Pula Fund 
(launched in 1994).30 In these cases, the logic of investing earned public income in capital 
market growth to spend in the future should be questioned when there are significant 
human capital deficits at present. As a simple illustration, if each country were to invest 
10 per cent of their sovereign wealth holdings in the health sector in 2019, the total health 
budget could potentially increase by around 20 per cent in Angola and 90 per cent in 
Botswana; investing 25 per cent could boost the health sector budget by close to 50 per 
cent in Angola and by more than 200 per cent in Botswana.31
30  Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2018). Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings.
31  Author’s calculations based on health expenditure data from the WHO’s Global Health Expenditure Database, GDP 
data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018) and sovereign investment data from the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute (2018); assumes that health expenditure as a percentage of GDP remains constant between 2015 and 
Figure 2.28. Potential additional impact of borrowing to increase human capital 
investments after a five-year projection period compared to the baseline scenario (in 
per child constant US$ and as %)
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Other governments may soon be presented with similar opportunities, as several 
countries are gearing up to be significant natural resource exporters. Kenya, for example, 
initiated its first exports of crude oil from the northern region of Turkana in mid-2018 
through a pilot trucking scheme, which will remain in place until a pipeline is built to the 
coast.32 As production scales, output is expected to reach around 80,000 barrels a day 
by 2022,33 with the Sovereign Wealth Bill 2019 recently tabled to manage the resources.34 
In Mozambique, several liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects are under construction, 
with exports expected to begin in 2022.35 Forecasts indicate that these could catapult 
the country into the world’s sixth-largest producer of LNG and generate somewhere 
around US$80 billion of revenue for the government over time.36 In Uganda, oil exports 
are likely to start in 2021, with fields expected to produce up to 230,000 barrels a day at 
full production.37 In 2015, a Petroleum Fund was established to facilitate the management 
of the new revenue and was recently tapped to support the budget in fiscal year 2018.38 
The United Republic of Tanzania has an estimated 57 trillion cubic feet of proven but 
largely undeveloped natural gas reserves, which could generate somewhere around 
US$5 billion annually in LNG exports.39 The main fields should become operational 
around 2025, and the government is envisaging the creation of an Oil and Gas Fund to 
manage the income.40 Lastly in Zambia, while the government announced its intention 
to establish a sovereign wealth fund for its copper revenues back in 2014, this has yet to 
move forward.41
In the country studies, fiscal savings were discussed as options to increase investment 
in human capital but not modelled. For example, the Botswana report described the 
political difficulties of accessing resources from the Pula Fund, given the focus on 
maintaining fiscal buffers to support the country’s economic adjustment strategy as 
mineral production declines over time. In Angola, it was noted that a maximum of 
7.5 per cent of the sovereign wealth fund can be used to support social development 
programmes, although the mechanisms and beneficiaries remain unclear. And in Kenya, 
Mozambique, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, the reports described the 
strong potential of sovereign wealth funds to support human capital investments at 
some point in the future. However, it was not possible to accurately model alternative 
scenarios over the medium term given uncertainties around the initiation and volume of 
production, as well as around how those future revenue flows will be managed.
2.6.7. Capturing and/or preventing illicit financial flows
Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are a major potential source of funding for investment in 
human capital in many of the countries studied. IFFs characterize money that is illegally 
earned, transferred or used that crosses borders and includes practices like mispricing 
traded goods, transferring money to shell companies abroad and non-reporting of 
2019, that the IMF’s GDP projections for 2019 are accurate and that the level of investment holdings as of November 2018 
is the same in 2019.
32  Paraskova, T. (2018). Kenya Starts Its First-Ever Crude Oil Exports. Oil Price, 4 June.
33  Otieno, B. (2018). Tullow Oil Projects Sh120 Billion Annual Revenue for Kenya. The Star, 7 June.
34  Kamau, M. (2019). State Banks on Oil Dollars to Pay Off Debt. Standard Media Kenya, 14 February.
35  Daiss, T. (2019). Can Mozambique Avoid the Natural Resource Curse? Oil Price, 2 January.
36  Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique (2018). Mozambique: Over 77 Billion Dollars in Taxes Expected From LNG, 17 
May.
37  Aglionby, J. (2017). Uganda’s Oil Reserves Bring Promise of Work and Infrastructure. Financial Times, 27 April.
38  Wesonga, N. (2018). Government Moves Shs125b from Petroleum Fund. Daily Monitor, 3 April.
39  Bungane, B. (2018). Tanzania: Use of Natural Gas Can Boost Economic Growth. ESI Africa, 21 March.
40  Husseini, T. (2018). Shell and Equinor Reaffirm Commitment to Tanzania LNG Project. OffshoreTechnology.com, 16 
October.
41  Chishimba, N. (2018). A Zambian Sovereign Wealth Fund: Could it be the answer to our over-reliance on mining 
revenues? Mining for Zambia, 19 September.
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Figure 2.29.  Trends in illicit financing flows, 2004-13 (in billions of current USD and as % 
of GDP, total and average of 16 countries)
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Figure 2.30. IFFs, 2011-13 period averages (in millions of current USD and as % of GDP)
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cash movements. In addition to enabling organized crime, facilitating corruption and 
undermining governance, IFFs hinder development objectives by limiting tax revenues, 
including customs duties, income taxes and VAT.42 Looking at the latest available three-
year period averages (2011-13), IFFs amounted to around US$33 billion or 7.6 per cent 
of GDP per year when combining the group of 16 countries (Figure 2.29). Notably, these 
were almost exclusively the result of trade mispricing, with capital flight (also known as 
“hot money”) accounting for only around 4 per cent of total outflows, on average.
Capturing even a portion of IFFs could significantly bolster human capital investment 
in many contexts. The latest three-year estimates indicate that the average annual 
outflow of IFFs was between 6 and 9 per cent of GDP in four of the countries studied 
(Eswatini, Madagascar, Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania), between 10 
and 15 per cent of GDP in five of the countries (Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda and 
Zambia) and around 20 per cent of GDP in South Africa (Figure 2.30). As an illustration, 
if governments were able to prevent or recapture 50 per cent of the IFFs in a given fiscal 
year, effectively tax those resources by 10 per cent and then direct all the new revenue to 
the health sector, public investment in health would increase by 11 per cent on average 
42  Global Financial Integrity (2015). Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2004-2013. Washington, DC.
Figure 2.31. Potential additional impact of recapturing half of estimated IFFs on health 
expenditure (as % increase on health budget based on the application of different tax 
rates: 10%, 20% and 30%)
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across the sample or by as much as 20 per cent in Rwanda, 30 per cent in Zambia and 
50 per cent in Comoros (Figure 2.31: blue bars). If those recaptured resources were 
alternatively taxed at a higher rate, such as 30 per cent, health sector investment could 
jump by more than 33 per cent across the sample or climb by more than 90 per cent in 
Zambia and 140 per cent in Comoros (Figure 2.31: grey bars).
Data constraints prevented the development of country scenarios to estimate the 
impact of different policy responses on IFFs and funding human capital investment. 
Nonetheless, most of the reports discussed trends and potential approaches, noting 
that there are many things that governments can do to prevent and recapture IFFs. This 
includes a variety of actions to strengthen customs controls, procurement processes, 
and tax collection and enforcement capacity. Detailed policy approaches have been 
described in a variety of recent reports, from organizations including Global Financial 
Integrity,43 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)44 and the World 
Bank.45 At the same time, the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime partnered to create the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, which provides support 
to end safe havens for corrupt funds and facilitate more systematic and timely return of 
stolen assets.46 
2.7 Regional and country perspectives on fiscal space in ESAR
At the regional level, the starting point is to recognize that the human capital investment 
outlook is slightly negative, on average, but with very mixed performance. Returning to 
the baseline projections of the evolution of human capital investment shown earlier in 
Section 2.4.4, real per child expenditure was predicted to slightly decline over a five-
year period across the 16 countries, on average. However, the forecasts were diverse, 
with five countries declining steeply (more than 10 per cent), three countries contracting 
minimally (between 2 and 5 per cent), two countries experiencing very modest increases 
(around 2.5 per cent), and six countries undergoing larger increases (20 per cent or 
more). Irrespective of the projected trajectory, developing the human capital base is a 
priority for all governments, which means that maximum efforts should be devoted to 
increasing expenditure in these areas. 
But what are the most promising options from a regional perspective? One possible 
approach to addressing this question is to look at the regional averages for the 
alternative scenarios that were modelled. However, several important caveats must be 
noted. First, the different adjustments made to each macro-fiscal programming model 
and assumptions made remain fully valid, as described in Annex 2. Second, only 38 of 
the 87 alternative scenarios that were included in the 16 studies were analysed in Section 
2.5, which means that the data offer an imperfect picture of the potential fiscal space 
that could be created (or not). Lastly, the regional averages mask stark differences and 
opportunities at the country level. 
Bearing these methodological issues in mind, reprioritizing the budget appears to be one 
of the best opportunities to raise expenditure on human capital in the region. The nine 
countries that included this as an alternative scenario found it having the largest potential 
returns. On average, progressively reallocating resources away from non-priority areas 
43  Ibid.
44  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2017). Impact of Illicit Financial Flows on Domestic 
Resource Mobilization: Optimizing Revenues from the Mineral Sector in Africa. Addis Ababa: UNECA, African Union and 
African Minerals Development Centre.
45  Reuter, P. (2012). Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
46  See: https://star.worldbank.org/.
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to human capital sectors could potentially increase real per child expenditure by an 
average of around 30 per cent above the baseline scenarios (Figure 2.32). While this 
approach requires strong political will, all governments should have some flexibility to 
alter their budget priorities, even if starting with small changes. This should make budget 
reprioritization the most likely prospect in the region.
Revenue is another very promising channel to increase human capital investment in the 
region. While most countries were expected to benefit from natural revenue growth over 
the projection periods, the impact of larger budgets will likely be minimized by rising 
prices and population sizes. However, adjusting existing rates, introducing new taxes and/
or strengthening collection and enforcement capacity can help all governments extract 
more revenue from their economies to support greater expenditure on human capital. 
The potential opportunity was demonstrated by the fact that half of the governments 
studied were recently extracting a level of taxes equivalent to less than 15 per cent of the 
size of their economies, which is very low by global standards. VAT was looked at almost 
universally in the country studies, with many also focusing on CIT and PIT, as well as 
innovative tax measures. When taken together, the different approaches modelled in all 
Figure 2.32. Potential additional impact of five alternative scenarios to increase human 
capital investments after a five-year projection period compared to the baseline scenario 
(in per child constant US$ and as %)
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the countries showed the possibility of increasing real per child expenditure 10 per cent 
higher than the baseline scenarios, on average (Figure 2.32). While the political scope 
for tax increases will be limited in contexts of fiscal tightening or slow growth, improved 
administration is likely to be more generally accepted and is a strong fiscal space option 
for the region.
Addressing spending inefficiencies would be another very good way to boost actual 
investment in human capital sectors across the region. While data constraints impeded 
the development of modelling scenarios in most countries, the projected results from 
three countries were promising. There, progressively enhancing budget execution rates 
in one or more human capital sectors was forecast to increase real per child expenditure 
by an average of nearly 20 per cent above the baseline scenarios after five years (Figure 
2.32). The rapid review of the recent performance of budget credibility rates from various 
sources also confirmed the magnitude of the problem facing most countries, especially 
for capital items, and further underscored the unexploited potential of this approach to 
enhance fiscal space. 
The other options for supporting greater expenditure on human capital sectors were 
either confined to a subset of countries in the region or require further investigation. 
This includes ODA, borrowing, fiscal savings and IFFs, which are briefly discussed below. 
On the ODA front, the near-term projections suggest that increasing the volumes of 
grants and concessional loans could benefit some countries. Recent beneficiaries of large 
ODA flows, especially LICs, could make a compelling case for increased support given 
the existing human capital deficits. Of the six countries that included this alternative 
modelling scenario, projections suggested that advocacy to attract more foreign 
assistance could boost real per child expenditure by an average of close to 20 per cent 
above the baseline scenarios after five years (Figure 2.32).
Similarly, the rapid accumulation of debt in recent years indicates that borrowing will 
not be a primary prospect for the region. The growth of domestic debt acts as a major 
bottleneck, as short maturities and high interest rates mean that repayments are already 
pressuring many national budgets. And while the updated global thresholds indicate 
that there may be some space for greater external debt stocks, lack of creditworthiness 
coupled with high existing obligations limit this potential, particularly when considering 
that investment in human capital sectors only generates economic returns over long 
horizons – and far beyond short-term repayment periods. Nonetheless, four country 
studies did look at this option, demonstrating the possibility of increasing real per 
child expenditure by an average of more than 10 per cent above the baseline scenarios 
according to different arrangements (Figure 2.32). Another six countries are expected 
to have relatively manageable debt loads over the near term (e.g. below 40 per cent of 
GDP), which could suggest at least the possibility for further exploration of this avenue.
Turning to fiscal savings, this could be a viable option in the distant future for the group 
of countries that are expected to become significant exporters of natural resources. 
However, questions surrounding the timelines for and management of future revenues 
remain too great at present for this to be a realistic near-term consideration. This option 
was not modelled in the country studies, but the use of resources stored in sovereign 
wealth funds can certainly be evaluated in Angola and Botswana.
Lastly, IFFs are one of the most exciting potential pathways to produce fiscal space in the 
region, but more information is needed. The estimated magnitude of illicit resources is 
distressing in most countries, and the simple illustrations used to demonstrate how the 
prevention or capturing of these funds could positively impact human capital budgets 
was hopeful. Regrettably, the lack of reliable data at the country level was too great 
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to allow for a modelling attempt: this also stands as a barrier to better understanding 
and addressing the underlying factors that enable IFFs to flourish. Nonetheless, IFFs are 
clearly an area of research that should be at the fore of government and DP agendas. 
Turning to each of the 16 countries studied, what can be said about the most feasible 
fiscal space options over the near term? One perspective can be obtained by analysing 
information from global databases alongside the results of the alternative scenarios 
from the adjusted macro-fiscal programming models (as presented in Section 2.5). In 
other words, assessing performance against a general set of key indicators can offer an 
initial indication of country-level potential to pursue different fiscal space strategies. The 
methodology used to carry out this rapid classification is described in Annex 3, which 
included looking at the average annual projected changes over the 2019-21 period for 
some indicators and the latest available levels for others, and then rating them against 
objective criteria (to the degree possible). 
The country-by-country results are summarized on the following pages. Table 2.01 uses 
a colour coding scheme that indicates the likely potential of each country to increase 
fiscal space for greater investment in human capital across 14 different indicators. To 
better contextualize the likely position of each country, the first column presents the 
natural fiscal space outlook for human capital, reflecting the real per child expenditure 
projections from the baseline modelling scenarios presented in Section 2.4.4. Building 
on that information, Table 2.02 attempts to provide an aggregated view across the seven 
fiscal space categories reviewed in the report.
The key takeaway from this rapid classification approach is that every country has 
at least one very strong potential option to boost investment in human capital over 
the near term. With five high-potential categories identified, Botswana emerges as the 
country with the largest number of opportunities that could be explored. Malawi, Rwanda, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania were each found to have four high-potential 
categories available for further investigation, with three each in Angola, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Zambia. Reprioritization emerges as the category providing the biggest 
opportunity across the sample (identified as high potential in 13 countries), followed by 
revenue, ODA and IFFs (in eight countries each). 
The other important takeaway is that countries can simultaneously pursue a variety 
of fiscal space strategies. This could involve looking across multiple categories (e.g. 
reprioritization, the efficiency of spending and ODA) or across multiple options within 
a single category (e.g. introducing a new tax – for example on property, increasing the 
tax rates applied to luxury goods by a certain percentage, and strengthening efforts 
to improve tax administration capacity). Ultimately the generation of small amounts of 
fiscal space from different sources can quickly add up and significantly alter the human 
capital investment trajectory in each country. 
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Category Outlook Revenue ODA Reprioritization Spending efficiency Borrowing
Fiscal
savings
IFFs
Source country 
model
country 
model
IMF IMF country 
model
OECD country 
model
SIPRI, WHO country 
model
budget briefs, 
PERs, PEFA, 
BOOST
country 
model
IMF IMF Sovereign 
Wealth Fund 
Institute
Global Finan-
cial Integrity
Indicator type projected 
annual 
change
projected an-
nual change
projected an-
nual change
Level projected an-
nual change
projected an-
nual change
projected an-
nual change
level projected 
annual 
change
level projected an-
nual change
level projected an-
nual change
yes/no level
Indicator real per 
child ex-
penditure 
(%)
real per child 
expenditure 
above base-
line (%)
real per cap-
ita revenue 
(%)
tax revenue, 
latest 
(% of GDP)
real per child 
expenditure 
above base-
line (%)
real per capi-
ta ODA (%)
real per child 
expenditure 
above base-
line (%)
mili-
tary-to-health 
ratio, latest (%)
real per 
child expen-
diture above 
baseline 
(%)
education 
and health 
budget cred-
ibility rates, 
latest (%)
real per child 
expenditure 
above base-
line (%)
level of debt 
distress, 
latest
gross debt, 
2019 (% of 
GDP)
sovereign 
wealth fund 
established
IFFs, 
latest 
(% of GDP)
Angola 18.2 1.0 0.6 10.3 2.0 -5.1 12.9 1.03 1.13 71.8 yes 0.5
Botswana -0.4 1.1 1.4 20.8 18.0 1.1 0.52 13.5 yes 12.3
Burundi -2.7 2.3 -3.0 12.2 4.9 -8.0 0.32 2.4 0.97 high 63.5 1.4
Comoros 5.2 5.5 0.1 1.7 -1.1 7.9 1.15 0.96 2 high 30.5 0.1
Eswatini -2.7 0.5 -0.3 28.6 40.1 4.2 0.17 0.7 44.3 7.2
Kenya 13.7 3.3 3.0 15.8 -2.4 0.17 4.3 0.81 moderate 55.4 1.7
Lesotho -2.3 0.4 3.2 36.4 37.0 0.9 0.15 0.74 low 38.7 3.7
Madagascar 3.8 2.7 0.6 11.4 3.6 0.14 0.77 moderate 36.4 5.7
Malawi 0.7 6.0 2.4 17.3 1.6 27.4 2.6 0.08 0.89 8 moderate 57.6 11.9
Mozambique -0.6 3.0 -0.3 20.1 6.8 -5.0 0.14 0.89  distress 118.7 9.1
Namibia -5.5 0.8 1.3 28.5 16.4 0.8 0.32 1.04 54.0 14.0
Rwanda 7.2 1.2 3.2 14.8 8.3 20.7 0.26 0.89 low 43.4 10.1
South Africa -3.7 0.8 0.9 27.1 -11.5 0.11 0.99 57.3 19.8
Tanzania 11.4 1.2 5.7 11.9 -2.8 0.24 0.66 0 low 38.6 9.1
Uganda 0.7 3.5 4.6 13.5 7.5 0.39 0.73 1 low 44.7 4.4
Zambia -0.9 1.4 -0.5 14.9 10.8 0.23 0.95 high 77.6 15.1
Table 2.01. Country profiles: Rapid assessment of fiscal space potential by select indicators, 2019-21 (or latest available) (in projected 
average annual changes or latest available levels – see Annex 3 for description of rating methodology)
Legend
Low Medium High NA
Note: This rapid categorization is only intended to be illustrative and to facilitate an initial dialogue of fiscal space 
opportunities that could be explored at the country level, including through the collection and analysis of the latest 
available information.
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Table 2.02. Country profiles: Rapid assessment of fiscal space potential by categories over 2019-21 period
(see Annex 3 for description of rating methodology)
Outlook Revenue ODA
Repriorit-
ization
Spending 
efficiency
Borrowing
Fiscal
savings
IFFs
Categorical Potential
High Medium Low
Angola 3 1 3
Botswana 5 1 0
Burundi 1 3 2
Comoros 2 2 2
Eswatini 2 4 0
Kenya 3 0 3
Lesotho 3 3 0
Madagascar 2 4 0
Malawi 4 2 0
Mozambique 1 4 1
Namibia 3 1 2
Rwanda 4 2 0
South Africa 1 2 3
Tanzania 4 1 1
Uganda 4 2 0
Zambia 3 1 2
Legend
Low Medium High NA
Note: This rapid categorization is only intended to be illustrative and to facilitate an initial dialogue of fiscal space 
opportunities that could be explored at the country level, including through the collection and analysis of the latest 
available information.
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGETS 
IN ESAR
Having identified opportunities for governments to create fiscal space to further develop 
their human capital base, the report now tries to understand how to carry such messages 
forward and ultimately influence investment decisions. To do so, it presents the main 
findings from the 16 political economy analyses that complemented the fiscal space 
studies. It starts by providing a short overview of how the assessments were carried out 
at country level. It then offers a regional picture of budget processes, including political 
and economic factors as well as dynamics and actors that influence decision-making 
processes. Following the descriptive analysis, the chapter presents specific entry points 
that UNICEF and partners can explore when advocating for more and better expenditure 
on human capital, which cut across the budget cycle as well as the budget transparency 
and accountability agenda. 
3.1 Background to the country studies
The political economy analyses sought to uncover the various incentives that underpin 
decisions in each country’s budget cycle. The research identified the key stakeholders in the 
budget process and the motivations that inform them in terms of prioritizing, planning and 
allocating budgets to line ministries, specialized agencies and/or sub-national authorities. 
The studies focused on the sectors that are most relevant for children’s welfare and human 
capital, and ultimately identified entry points and strategies that could be adopted by 
UNICEF to more effectively influence PFM processes. 
The analyses drew on information from state and non-state actors that are involved in or 
contribute to policy-making and budgeting in the area of human capital. Secondary data 
included documents and publications from governments, UNICEF, DPs and civil society 
organizations (CSOs), as well as global data sources. Primary data was mainly collected 
through face-to-face interviews and email exchanges. At the country level, meetings were 
held with key stakeholders in government ministries, international financial institutions 
(IFIs), DPs and CSOs. 
As in the fiscal space studies, the political economy work was also conducted in three 
phases. During the first phase, which was desk-based, relevant documentation was 
collected, discussions were held with the respective UNICEF country offices, and field 
work preparations were made. The second phase consisted of a field mission to interview 
key stakeholders, which normally lasted seven working days. The missions were led by 
a consultant from Ecorys or DNA Economics, with the assistance of a local consultant. 
The third phase was preparing a final report that brought together the key findings and 
conclusions. 
The analytical reports were divided into four chapters. The first chapter addressed the 
broader political context of the country and presented key political factors that affect the level 
and allocation of resources. The second chapter analysed current government strategies 
and reflected on the priorities given to human capital issues. The third chapter focused on 
the budget process itself, describing the institutional and legal budgeting framework, as 
well as the key actors and their levels of influence. The final chapter presented strategic 
entry points for UNICEF to advocate for more and better investment in children. 
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The inherent complexities of conducting a political economy analysis presented challenges 
in some contexts. In particular, understanding and receiving authentic insights into the 
motivations of institutions and specific actors was not always straightforward. Access, 
time, and perceived credibility and trust were among the factors that had to be overcome 
in order for certain truths to surface. As such, the depth and quality of the assessments, 
which were conducted in relatively short timeframes, generally varied according to the 
availability of interviewees and their information. In some cases, these challenges made it 
difficult to develop concrete suggestions for UNICEF. 
3.2 The political economy context of the budget
The “economic growth” narrative dominates development discourse and investment 
decisions in ESAR. Many of the countries studied have focused their national development 
strategies (e.g. long-term visions and medium-term implementation plans) on increasing 
growth in order to achieve higher income status. This has directly influenced budget 
discussions, as authorities place more emphasis on the economic returns of their 
investments. As a result, one of the key challenges for UNICEF and other partners in 
advocating for more child-focused expenditure is to convince decision makers that such 
spending is, in fact, a long-term investment – developing the human capital and hence 
economic potential of the country – rather than a short-term cost.
The structure of the economy and the level of growth are also important influencers. 
Some countries, such as Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, discovered natural 
resources relatively recently, which contributes to a generally positive economic outlook 
and a sense of optimism for the long term. In contrast places like Angola and Botswana, 
which have depended on oil and diamonds respectively for decades, face a sense of 
urgency to undergo structural reforms to increase the competitiveness of non-resource 
sectors of the economy and ensure that growth can be sustained as natural resources are 
depleted. In other countries, like South Africa and, in turn, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia, 
weakening global trade conditions have hampered economic growth and hence revenues. 
This has resulted in intensifying fiscal austerity, which presents a worrisome outlook for 
human capital expenditure. 
Beyond the economy, low budgetary transparency and accountability have direct impacts 
on budgeting processes in the region. Rent-seeking and patronage are everyday realities 
in some environments: these hinder efficient and effective spending across the board. 
This can involve the disappearance of resources, personal gain as a driving force behind 
budget allocations, and the suspension of ODA as DPs suspend support due to corruption 
and impunity. To illustrate the latter, ODA declines were triggered by the discovery of 
massive amounts of undisclosed loans in Mozambique and the looting of public funds 
during the “Cashgate” scandal in Malawi. In short, the absence of effective governance 
measures to identify and prevent the abuse of public power continues to directly affect 
budget processes and the availability of resources for human capital sectors. 
At the same time, DPs are exerting less influence over policy and budgeting processes. 
There are various reasons behind this. First, sustained, high economic growth has led to less 
dependence on aid, along with an increased sense of autonomy and national pride, such as 
in Rwanda and Zambia. Second, new, non-traditional actors, including China, have emerged 
to offer alternative sources of financing without conditionalities, which has reduced the 
influence of DPs in places like Angola and Kenya. Third, the change in aid modalities, marked 
by a move away from general budget support toward sector support, has caused policy 
dialogue to shift from the national level to sector levels, which characterizes most LICs. 
Fourth, many countries studied are facing temporary suspension or sudden declines in aid 
because of political crisis (e.g. Burundi) or fraud allegations (e.g. Malawi and Mozambique).
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Executive branches remain powerful and shape development and investment decisions 
in most ESAR countries. In Angola, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania, for 
example, presidential will drives the development process. While anti-corruption and anti-
patronage stances are praiseworthy, critics point to the risks of creating cultures of fear and 
limiting democratic processes. In other countries, excessive use of executive power has 
led to crises, such as in Burundi where a political crisis broke out when the president ran 
for a third term. In Eswatini, where the King concentrates power and political parties are 
banned, the executive stalls progress. Hence, the executive branch, whether supporting a 
development agenda or not, is a key influencer in policy and budget allocation processes.
Political instability is another important regional factor that affects the design of budgets. 
In Lesotho, three elections were recently held over a five-year period, demonstrating the 
inherent instability of coalition governments, which are easily dismantled by political 
infighting and no-confidence motions. Madagascar has witnessed regular political crises 
that generated periods of harsh economic recession. Since the end of the last major 
political crisis in 2013, the country has begun to recover, but politics continues to disrupt. 
The November 2018 election was bitterly contested, including by former presidents, and 
only decided after a run-off and the eventual intervention by the High Constitutional Court. 
Although political instability can sometimes lead to a shift in government which, in turn, 
can turn out to be positive for investment in social sectors, unstable politics are generally 
bad for growth and advocacy efforts.
Political parties, which tend to lack ideological foundations, are additional forces over 
budget processes in many countries. In general, voter preferences and political dynamics are 
not founded on ideologies, but rather on other dimensions, such as ethnic backgrounds or 
regional affiliations. This is clearly the case in countries like Kenya and Malawi. The policies 
of political parties and members of parliament (MPs) also tend to be driven by individual 
and clientelistic goals. In such contexts, using party ideology for advocacy purposes is a 
dead end. Furthermore, various ESAR countries face strong political polarization, which 
often contributes to high levels of patronage. Patronage, in turn, is generally not supportive 
of policy-based allocation processes, such as evidenced in Comoros. 
Lastly, decentralization and local politics are increasingly important influencers of budget 
processes in the region. Kenya is the most extreme example: the rapid devolution process 
has given 47 counties a large degree of independence from the national government. In 
most countries, however, decentralization mainly concerns the downward delegation of 
service delivery, while decision-making and budget-making powers remain at the central 
level. Despite the move toward decentralization, local governments remain heavily 
dependent on central governments for funding via transfers. And while most countries 
show strong interest in increasing local revenue generation capacity and achieving greater 
autonomy, local empowerment remains undermined by political tensions and the unofficial 
desire of key stakeholders to keep power centralized. 
3.3 Key dynamics and actors in budget processes
3.3.1. Budgeting dynamics
ESAR is marked by varying degrees of transparency, oversight and participation in budget 
processes. For example, on one side of the spectrum, South Africa touts the highest Open 
Budget Index score in the world, providing its citizens with “extensive” information (Figure 
3.01). On the other side of the spectrum, Lesotho has the lowest score in the world, which 
indicates that it provides no budget information in the public domain. The degree of budget 
openness in a country directly affects the ability of UNICEF and DPs to influence budget 
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Source: International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2017). Open Budget Survey 2017. Washington, DC.
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Figure 3.01.  Open Budget Index scores in the 16 political economy countries, 2017
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processes and hence advocacy strategies to increase child-focused expenditure. In very 
open contexts, UNICEF can use budget data and participation mechanisms to move the 
human capital agenda forward. Closed contexts, in contrast, require a stronger focus on 
making budget processes more open. 
Although most countries have implemented PFM reforms to establish a structured 
framework around budgeting processes, compliance continues to present challenges. For 
example, in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, sound legislative frameworks are in place. The laws, however, are not always 
followed. In Malawi and Uganda, the budget process offers many opportunities for 
consultations and inputs from various stakeholders, but in practice the processes are 
rituals rather than genuine forums for dialogue. Other examples of non-compliance are 
expenditure ceilings that are altered after formal deadlines (e.g. Kenya) or where budget 
calendars are not adhered to (e.g. Malawi). Nonetheless, the existence of comprehensive 
legislation is important for advocacy efforts. As noted by a recent World Bank study on the 
political economy of PFM reforms, although laws are not consistently applied, “improved 
PFM rules are an important foundation for seeking better de facto management of public 
resources.”47 
In some cases, the legislative framework itself would benefit from changes. For instance, in 
Eswatini, the entire process is very secretive. And in Angola, there are no official channels 
for participation, while large extra-budgetary expenditure, unrealistic budget figures and 
the lack of comprehensive budget classification make it impossible to decipher the real 
expenditure of different ministries. Lack of budget credibility and weaknesses in budget 
execution and reporting also complicate the participation of outside actors in the budget 
process, which was particularly acute in Comoros.
3.3.2. Budgeting actors
The executive leads budgeting processes through the MoF. In all countries, the MoF sets 
the rules and supervises budget preparation. Moreover, the MoF leads discussions with 
line ministries and puts together a comprehensive budget proposal, which is approved by 
cabinet before going to parliament for review.
In most countries the presidency wields large influence over the budget. Here, the presidency 
interferes with the MoF’s mandate and the budget process, which can include changing 
budget ceilings after deadlines have passed or reallocating funds without justification. In 
places like Kenya and Rwanda, presidential pledges have the highest priority and can lead 
to significant budget reallocations in the final stages of budget preparation or even during 
budget execution.
In other countries, the MoF can push its own agenda. In Madagascar, for example, the 
MoF is powerful partly because of strong engagement of the IMF, which provides it with 
technical capacity. In Angola, the MoF’s authority stems from the highly centralized 
decision-making structure of the political system as well as the relative weakness of other 
parts of the administrative system. In Lesotho, political instability has allowed the MoF to 
dominate the budget planning stage.
Conversely, the position of line ministries tends to be weakened by the dominance of the 
presidency and the MoF. While some degree of top-down budgeting is required, in most 
countries the power of the presidency and/or the MoF leaves little room for line ministries 
to exert influence. In countries where the MoF and/or presidency do not comply with the 
47  World Bank (2017). Political Economy of Public Financial Management Reforms. Washington, DC. 
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budget calendar, line ministries are left to adjust their planning and budgets according 
to central-level decisions. In a number of countries, it was reported that lack of regard for 
sector budgeting hurt social sectors. Human capital-related spending, such as for child 
protection or nutrition, are easily scratched off during budget preparation. The situation 
in Lesotho is different from most other countries in this regard. There, political instability 
enables line ministries to “play the system” by omitting priority programmes from their 
budget because they know that the MoF will reintroduce them later.
The limited capacity of line ministries further diminishes their influence even if they 
have opportunities to engage in budget dialogue. In many countries, problems were 
encountered in planning and budgeting at the sector level. Medium-term sector strategies 
were not elaborated, and when they existed they were not costed or largely written by 
consultants. Lack of financial knowledge affects the quality of budget proposals and gives 
ample room for the MoF to simply overrule the line ministries or to set priorities on their 
behalf. Furthermore, the lack of knowledge on costing and budgeting negatively impacts 
intra-sectoral budgets and plans. In South Africa, for example, the Department of Basic 
Education faces a situation in which personnel expenditure crowds out all forms of non-
discretionary expenditure.
In decentralized contexts, the main budget decisions are still taken at the central level. 
Local governments are usually given responsibility for service delivery. While they are 
granted certain autonomy in how to organize this, they remain financially dependent on the 
central government. Some form of bottom-up input is usually provided during the budget 
formulation process, but local priorities are not always translated to the central level. This 
could result from the central government successfully defending its own interests over 
those of the local government and/or low levels of local government capacity to set budget 
priorities. Lack of representation can also be problematic for social sectors.
The role of DPs in budget processes has been mostly confined to the sector level. Previously, 
DPs were often represented in budget support working groups. As general budget support 
conditions touched upon inter-sectoral issues, the dialogue took place partly at the central 
level. However, with the decline in general budget support, sector working groups are now 
the main platforms for DPs to interface with the budget design process.
On the civil society front, their ability to engage and influence budget processes varies 
widely. In some countries, CSOs are part of budget discussions and able to exert some 
influence over allocative decisions. Elsewhere, CSOs are provided a platform in budget 
dialogue, but this is more of a ritual. For example, in Malawi and Uganda, CSOs are 
consulted at various stages of the budget process, but there is limited scope to express 
views, feedback is not formalized and ideas are not actually debated. In places like Angola 
and Comoros, there are no spaces for CSOs to contribute to budgetary processes.
Similar to civil society, parliaments often lack the capacity and opportunities to influence 
budget processes. Most countries have introduced sophisticated budgetary oversight and 
external control frameworks to guide the budget process, especially approval and execution. 
Yet few MPs make meaningful changes, for various reasons. In some countries, MPs are 
driven by individual or clientelistic motivations, and rent-seeking and patronage block 
effective oversight. In other countries, MPs simply do not have the technical knowledge. 
Elsewhere, engagement is limited due to the parliament’s lack of independence from the 
executive branch. An independent parliamentary budget office has played a positive role 
in supporting the parliament’s budget oversight function in some countries. In Kenya, 
for example, this technical arm has a wealth of expertise, although MPs are not always 
interested in accessing this.
Audit offices and other control bodies face similar capacity challenges. This means that 
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following up on their findings depends on the executive branch and parliament. And even 
where actions are taken, ambition is usually quite limited. The culture of impunity, which 
is pervasive in some countries, can also greatly hinder the effective functioning of these 
institutions.
3.4 Advocacy entry points
Each of the 16 countries studied has a unique set of entry points to make the case for 
increased investment in human capital. This is partly explained by the distinct political 
economy environments across countries, but also by differences in PFM frameworks and 
practices. Another important factor is the capacity, experience and relationships of each 
UNICEF country office. Whereas some offices have designated staff working exclusively 
on PFM issues, others do not. At the same time, some offices have been engaging the 
government on PFM issues for more than five years, having jointly conducted multiple 
studies and other initiatives, and hence have developed close ties with influential decision 
makers. In contrast, other offices are new to the field and have much better contacts with 
social sector line ministries than with MoF officials or the parliament.
The 16 political economy studies demonstrate that there is a range of strategic opportunities 
for UNICEF to influence the budget cycle. When looking at the strategic planning phase, 
supporting line ministries to develop and cost strategies and plans was identified as the 
single biggest opportunity, followed by contributing to financing discussions and direct 
advocacy with the MoF (Figure 3.02). In the budget preparation phase, most country 
offices could exert significant influence by providing technical support to line ministries to 
develop their annual budgets, while also dialoguing with the MoF. At the approval phase, 
many offices have opportunities to work with parliament, both to share recommendations 
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on how the draft budget can be more responsive to children’s needs as well as to provide 
training to strengthen oversight functions. Lastly, during budget implementation, UNICEF 
country offices can identify and help to remove budget execution spending bottlenecks, 
especially at subnational levels, and also advocate for the MoF to generate and report on 
budget execution information. These opportunities are discussed below.
3.4.1. Strategic planning
Access and influence national financing dialogues
Space for external actors to influence policy dialogue has been shrinking in many ESAR 
countries in recent years, which poses a challenge to UNICEF’s advocacy efforts. As 
earlier discussed, this is partly due to the shift in aid modalities. At the same time, most 
governments in the region aspire to be more autonomous in policy and strategic priority 
setting. In practice, this has made it increasingly difficult for many UNICEF offices to 
meaningfully affect policy discourse in favour of child-friendly sectors at both strategic 
and technical levels. 
In some countries, there may still be a direct entry point to take part in discussions on 
budget allocations at national level. UNICEF should monitor such openings and capitalize 
where possible. For instance, in Madagascar and Malawi, elections create a level playing 
field where a new government may come in and be looking for assistance in policy 
making. This is also a potential opportunity to become involved in drafting new or updated 
National Development Strategies/Plans.
In other contexts, where spaces are more confined, partnerships with line ministries, 
CSOs or think tanks may allow for indirect advocacy at national level. When searching 
for strategic partnerships, UNICEF offices should consider both the existence of shared 
mandates and objectives and the actual impact of influence in formal budget decision-
making processes. In most countries, access to the cabinet and/or the presidency was 
viewed as difficult, but in some situations UNICEF succeeded in gaining access at that 
level, sometimes through informal channels.
In policy dialogue, UNICEF should build its advocacy argument on its expertise in child-
related matters. Partners tend to listen to UNICEF because staff have expertise on children’s 
issues and human capital – not because they are PFM experts. However, it is important that 
offices attempt to better link child-friendly expenditure with economic growth agendas, 
where applicable. This implies that UNICEF offices should take better advantage of 
advocacy-based PFM tools in the region, especially investment cases (e.g. cost-benefit 
analysis, cost of inaction analysis and economic return on investment analysis). PFM-
based investment cases are likely to make governments more receptive to advocacy 
efforts toward child-friendly expenditure. 
The country studies also shed light on emerging topics that UNICEF could use to better 
position itself to influence policy dialogue and financing discussions. These include the 
population boom, social protection and the economic growth agenda, which are briefly 
discussed below.
One big entry point is around the demographic dividend. Human capital expenditure 
is seen as having potential to harness the growth linked to the ongoing demographic 
transition that is taking place in most countries. Both the IMF and World Bank are paying 
more attention to population dynamics, calling for strengthening human capital to deliver 
greater and more inclusive growth. In addition to ensuring quality access to basic social 
services as the foundation for reaping demographic dividends, other key programmatic 
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issues include providing practical skills to the current and future labour force (e.g. through 
vocational education and job training programmes) and empowering women (e.g. by 
improving fertility choices and addressing cultural issues).
A second and related entry point is social protection. UNICEF has already made strong 
progress on this issue in many countries. The broader literature, as well as the growing 
body of experiences in the region, especially through the Transfer Project, is very 
compelling about the positive impacts of different social protection interventions on 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Most offices are well positioned to continue to 
build on this momentum, both by piloting approaches where social protection systems 
are non-existent or very limited, and by scaling interventions and linking to the cash plus 
agenda – connecting transfers to additional services, like early childhood development 
(ECD), nutrition and WASH. At the same time, weather forecasts indicate that countries in 
Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa could be hit by the forces of El Niño during 2019. 
Cyclone Idai, which reaped devastation across Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 
March 2019, was a humbling reminder of natural threats and the urgent need to strengthen 
social protection systems and their shock-responsiveness.
Linking children to the infrastructure and investment agendas is another potential entry 
point. This starts by recognizing that support for infrastructure can be beneficial to children. 
This includes both direct benefits (access to electricity can increase their study time, new 
or improved water and sanitation systems can improve their health and reduce their time 
spent doing household chores like fetching water, better roads can make it easier for them 
to reach schools and health facilities and hence improve learning and health outcomes, 
and so on), as well as indirect benefits (e.g. public works programmes, irrigation systems 
and access to electricity can create job opportunities for their parents and contribute to 
improved living standards). In parallel, now that most governments in the region have 
invested heavily to address physical infrastructure gaps, there may be opportunities to 
shape dialogue around national investment plans toward supporting access to social 
services and hence closing human capital investment gaps.
Promote a child focus in policy making and budgeting processes with the MoF
Many of the country studies argued that UNICEF needs to take better advantage of 
nurturing close partnership with the guardian of the budget: the MoF. Here, one potential 
entry point is around the development of annual budget guidelines, in particular in 
countries where UNICEF has a strong PFM profile and close working relations with the MoF. 
More specifically, UNICEF could engage in technical dialogue around budget preparation 
to encourage the reflection of children’s deprivations and needs in the budget. Another 
possible entry point is for UNICEF offices to follow up with the MoF early in the budget 
cycle to discuss how child-related priorities are incorporated into the budget framework 
paper (or the equivalent). 
Support line ministries to develop and cost strategies and plans
In many countries, sector strategies and plans either do not exist or are not meaningful. 
In practice, this means that they are either not costed or not considered during budget 
planning. However, strong sector plans can lead to more realistic and policy-based 
budgeting since they provide a framework for prioritizing resources each year. At the same 
time, good sector plans can also serve as advocacy ammunition for line ministries (and 
UNICEF), as they contain evidence that can be used to help convince the MoF and other 
influential decision makers of the importance of investing in social sectors.
UNICEF should consider increasing efforts to support line ministries as they formulate 
sector strategies and plans. Here it is imperative that strategy and planning documents 
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rely on a well-developed logical framework that identifies concrete targets and indicators 
that can be monitored and adjusted over time. In many cases, UNICEF staff directly 
provide drafting support but also help to identify and recruit outside expertise. UNICEF can 
also add significant value when the government is addressing cross-sectoral issues e.g. 
child protection, ECD, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, social protection and WASH. Here offices can 
showcase examples of strategies and plans developed in other countries, as well as serve 
as a convener and facilitator among relevant ministries. Developing a new sector strategy 
further presents an opportunity to highlight the potential return on investment and directly 
link to the economic growth agenda.
UNICEF should also play a significant role in supporting government counterparts to cost 
strategies and plans. Here a key lesson is the need to anchor costing exercises in actual 
budgets i.e. where the baseline builds on either the previous budget or the draft budget. 
Another practical lesson is to develop different cost scenarios so that the ministry can 
think through – and adapt to – alternative budget ceilings; this also forces counterparts to 
prioritize the most important programmes and activities. Where possible, UNICEF offices 
should invest in strengthening the costing skills of line ministry staff by bringing in external 
experts. Improved costing capacity can directly contribute to better-informed decisions on 
priorities and further empower line ministries to make more compelling funding pitches, 
both by providing a clear picture of the financing gap as well as by showcasing the potential 
returns that can be delivered through more resources (additional activities).
3.4.2. Budget preparation
Support line ministries to draft budget proposals 
One of the most common opportunities identified in the country studies was for UNICEF 
to help counterparts better compete for scarce resources. While inter-sectoral budget 
allocation is partly a political matter, it is also a technical one. The reality is that line 
ministries that submit quality budget proposals (i.e. they reflect priorities and demonstrate 
strong value for money) are more likely to receive additional funding requests. Many 
studies found that social sector ministries were unable to convince the MoF to increase 
their original expenditure ceiling because there was no track record or evidence that the 
funds would be spent effectively and efficiently.
Here UNICEF can provide advice and technical support as social sector ministries develop 
their annual budgets. This could involve help with writing the budget and/or providing 
quality assurance to ensure that submissions: (i) directly link to existing strategies and 
plans; (ii) prioritize issues that require greater funding attention (worsening malnutrition 
trends, rising numbers of children not reached by vaccinations, shortages of ECD teachers, 
the negative impact of inflation on cash transfer programmes, etc.) as well geographic 
regions or population groups that have fallen behind; (iii) support the most cost-effective 
approaches (and conversely scale back spending on programmes that are not demonstrating 
strong value for money); and (iv) address recurring spending imbalances across service 
levels (e.g. favouring tertiary over primary services) or on the economic classification of 
the budget (e.g. focusing too many resources on salaries at the expense of spending on 
infrastructure or operations and maintenance). This is also an opportunity to use available 
evidence, including from budget briefs and other recent public finance analyses.
At the same time, UNICEF can help strengthen the justifications for budget submissions. 
This could include providing evidence-based research that demonstrates why spending 
more on a new or expanded programme is a good thing or simply helping with messaging. 
This is also a potential training opportunity that UNICEF could initiate, as the skills required 
to formulate and defend budget proposals are lacking in many ministries. 
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Within countries, UNICEF should prioritize support for administrative units that are under-
resourced but strategically important for children. This naturally involves those that are 
focused on cross-sectoral issues e.g. child protection, ECD, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, social 
protection and WASH. In the country studies, there were strong examples of this type of 
support, such as to the Permanent Secretary for Social Protection in Burundi or the nutrition 
desk in the United Republic of Tanzania. However, this may also involve supporting multiple 
ministries when the mandates and functions are spread out. Empowered line ministries 
would serve as more effective counterparts to the MoF and would ultimately reduce the 
MoF’s workload and influence in the early stages of the budget process.
One natural entry point to strengthen budget submissions is through sector working 
groups. Although these platforms do not determine the allocation of resources across 
sectors, they do provide an arena to monitor and, where needed, adjust allocations within 
sectors. In terms of influencing the upcoming budget, one simple action is to ensure that 
one or more meetings are organized in the period between the announcement of the 
budget ceilings and the submission of the sector budget proposals, which can be used to 
review and improve the current draft.
Dialogue with the Ministry of Finance
To either safeguard or argue for increasing spending on human capital sectors, a strategic 
entry point is to engage the MoF during the drafting of the budget. This could include 
when the budget strategy/framework paper is being put together and/or during inter-
sectoral allocative decision-making processes. Most country studies found that it was 
not easy to meet the MoF at these stages. This is linked to the broader political economy 
context, especially when the MoF has a strong role in the budget process and there is little 
interest to involve external parties in allocative decisions.
Nevertheless, UNICEF should consider stepping up its advocacy efforts when budget 
ceilings are being established. In some countries where UNICEF has established deep 
relations with the MoF, advocacy is possible at a strategic level with the MoF. Here, UNICEF 
can call for maintaining a minimum level of expenditure for human capital sectors (or for 
increasing) by providing evidence on economic returns, making country comparisons and 
reminding the MoF of existing commitments (e.g. in national/sector plans or in international 
agreements, such as the Abuja Declaration, the Incheon Declaration, the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda and the SDGs). If UNICEF fails to get direct access to the MoF, it can liaise with local 
partners or other DPs where access and influence with the MoF already exist.
More attention could also be paid to influencing transfers to sub-national levels. In some 
countries, there is room to improve the equity orientation of formulas to ensure that 
underfunded issues and/or regions benefit from at least a fair share of resources, if not 
an added boost to help poorly performing areas to catch up. Child protection, education 
and health services are commonly delegated to local levels and could potentially stand to 
benefit from this type of engagement. Data and evidence generation can be particularly 
powerful. In Malawi, the country office is supporting the Ministry of Health to review the 
existing formula, including by showcasing best practices from neighbouring countries. 
Another example is UNICEF’s support to the Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit 
of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in Uganda, which has 
involved developing an online dashboard that monitors allocations to human capital 
sectors alongside outcome indicators at the district level. Such information is very helpful 
to feed into national and local budget planning processes, as it identifies which sectors and 
regions are being underfunded.
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3.4.3. Budget approval
Develop rapid budget analyses to influence parliamentary debate
Although the power of the parliament differs, the legislative body in all 16 countries does 
approve the national budget, thereby creating a universal advocacy entry point. The 
approach vis-à-vis parliament will vary from country to country. In countries where MPs 
run primarily on an individual agenda, with relatively weak party affiliations, providing 
reform-minded MPs (“champions”) with research and publications of voters’ spending 
preferences could be useful. In other contexts where party affiliations are relatively strong, 
it may be more difficult to influence individual MPs. If there is a strong opposition, UNICEF 
could consider supporting parliament with information on historical expenditure trends, 
as opposition MPs could use this to criticize the government and call for a rebalancing 
of the upcoming budget. However, UNICEF would need to move cautiously in such 
instances since this could adversely affect existing partnerships. To prevent political bias, 
an alternative approach could be to work with a local organization that has direct contact 
with MPs. 
Irrespective of the political landscape, one powerful activity is developing a rapid analysis 
of the draft budget to influence parliamentary debate before approval. Many UNICEF 
offices have now institutionalized this process, including Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda and Zambia. Here, the social policy teams spend up to a week analysing spending 
trends and offering concrete recommendations to improve the child sensitivity of the 
proposal. Given the time-sensitive nature of this activity, the recommendations commonly 
focus on inter-allocation issues (e.g. allocations to the WASH sector are significantly 
declining in real terms compared to the previous budget), but there are some instances 
where a more detailed analysis of human capital sectors or issues is undertaken (e.g. the 
budget to recruit new social workers falls far below the commitment in the new Social 
Protection Strategy). This information can either be shared with MPs individually and with 
parliamentary committees, or it can be presented at a public budget hearing. 
Strengthen parliament’s budget oversight capacity
Beyond arming the parliament with recommendations to improve the child sensitivity 
of the draft budget, UNICEF can also work to strengthen its oversight capacity. MPs are 
not elected because of their financial knowledge, and even those sitting in budget or 
sector committees may not be well-versed in reading and understanding the budget. One 
simple activity is to host workshops to help them read and analyse the budget with a 
human capital lens. This strategically complements UNICEF’s work on budget briefs, and 
both the process to develop the content and the key findings could serve as the learning 
curriculum. However, many offices have gone a step further and developed formal training 
programmes to support both parliamentarians and key personnel in finance and social 
sector ministries to understand the budget and how it affects human capital development 
(Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and the United Republic of Tanzania).
A longer-term option could be to establish or strengthen parliamentary budget offices to 
support routine budget analysis. Few of the countries studied had a budget office in place, 
and those that did were characterized by insufficient or unqualified staff which impeded 
the production of timely or meaningful information. One innovative approach is to create 
this function: this was done by the provision of UNICEF-supported staff inside parliaments 
in Malawi and Mozambique. In other contexts where some capacity does exist, such as 
South Africa, UNICEF collaborates closely to develop and share budget analyses.
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3.4.4. Budget execution
Diagnose budget execution challenges in human capital sectors
When discussing investment in human capital, the level and impact of spending depends 
significantly on the quality of budget execution. One of the key bottlenecks identified in 
most of the country studies is that resources allocated to human capital sectors are not 
being fully absorbed. This means that monitoring and increasing the efficiency of spending 
should be a high priority for most UNICEF offices.
As a starting point, budget briefs are an excellent tool to routinely monitor budget execution 
trends. All 16 UNICEF offices that participated in this regional initiative are producing 
annual budget briefs that review social sector investment patterns. While some contain 
standalone sections that examine budget credibility, very few provide data and analysis 
on budget execution. As a result, expanding the content of the annual briefs serves as an 
outstanding entry point for most offices to begin to influence budget execution processes.
From there, UNICEF offices should go one step further and pinpoint budget execution 
problems. There are several possible channels to do so. One is through Public Expenditure 
Reviews (PERs). At the end of 2018, nearly all 16 UNICEF offices were either conducting or 
had recently completed one or more PERs – roughly half in collaboration with the World 
Bank and the other half alone. Although PERs are a great diagnostic tool, they rarely 
provide in-depth analysis of budget execution bottlenecks. It would therefore be strategic 
to ensure that any ongoing and future studies include robust data collection on budget 
execution (both quantitative and qualitative, and across multiple administrative levels), 
and for this to be reflected in a standalone chapter that describes challenges and remedial 
actions.
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) could also be considered. This public 
finance tool tracks the flow of funds from the Treasury through central ministries down 
to subnational governments, and ultimately to service delivery points. Although it is not 
explicitly focused on execution, it can provide insights if a sub-sector or major programme 
is experiencing leakage as resources move through the system, which could hamper 
execution. At the end of 2018, 6 of the 16 country offices were either supporting or had 
recently supported a PETS, demonstrating its potential to be replicated and adapted for 
budget execution purposes. 
Another approach could be to initiate standalone budget execution assessments. For 
instance, UNICEF Lesotho and the World Bank jointly initiated a budget absorption capacity 
analysis of the health sector in 2018, with the aim of better understanding and correcting 
execution bottlenecks that severely affect capital spending. This is one of the first such 
studies ever undertaken and offers a good model for other offices.
Advocate for routine generation and analysis of budget execution information
A somewhat alternative entry point is to convince the MoF to produce routine reports 
on budget execution performance. Having better and more timely execution information, 
including by multiple classifications (administrative, economic and programme) and 
at subnational levels, would allow for continuous monitoring and identification of 
spending challenges. In contexts where the integrated financial management information 
system (IFMIS) does not exist or is nascent, the first step would be to support system 
the development and strengthening of the system, which would need to be done with 
partners that have specialized expertise (e.g. the African Development Bank, the European 
Union, the IMF and/or the World Bank). Ideally, the government should have a robust 
internal monitoring system, with comprehensive analyses being produced and published 
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throughout the budget cycle (e.g. through in-year, mid-year and year-end expenditure 
reports and audit reports). One noteworthy example is from Madagascar, where UNICEF 
has helped the MoF to publish 2-3 yearly budget execution reports since 2016, which have 
been released as Citizens Budgets.
3.4.5. Budget transparency and accountability
The supply of and demand for budget information is essential to advocate for greater and 
more effective spending on human capital throughout the budget cycle. On the supply side, 
the countries studied have done a lot of work around monitoring, advocating and providing 
technical assistance to generate and publish more and better budget information in the 
public domain (Figure 3.03). Many of these activities were catalysed through UNICEF’s 
regional initiative on budget transparency and will continue to serve as a strategic area 
of engagement. The demand side, however, remains largely unexploited by UNICEF. Here 
there are opportunities to establish or create platforms for citizens and the government 
to discuss and debate budget issues, especially during reviews of the budget proposal, 
as well as to engage with supreme audit institutions and public accounts committees – 
two actors that UNICEF offices have had very limited interaction with. Supporting one or 
more PFM reforms could also be a sensible approach where budget openness is a serious 
constraint. These opportunities are discussed below. 
Figure 3.03. Main advocacy entry points identified in the budget cycle in the 16 political 
economy countries (in # of countries)
1
1
7
3
3
Monitoring and advocating
Providing technical assistance
Facilitating budget discussion forums
Supporting supreme audit institutions and
public accounts committees
Lobbying for relevant PFM reforms
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Monitor and advocate for better budget transparency
One of UNICEF’s biggest opportunities is to continue actively monitoring budget 
transparency and advocating for improved practices. In 2017, UNICEF began working 
with the International Budget Partnership (IBP) to support efforts to monitor and improve 
budget transparency in the region. This included financial support to expand IBP’s 
flagship product, the Open Budget Survey, in seven new countries (Burundi, Comoros, 
Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Somalia and South Sudan). The survey assesses the 
amount and quality of budget information that is produced in the public domain, along 
with parliament’s budget oversight functions and the availability of opportunities for 
the public to contribute to budget processes. Following the release of the Open Budget 
Survey 2017 results, UNICEF and IBP jointly organized two regional workshops (one 
for Lusophone countries and one for others) in April 2018, in which 17 MoFs developed 
action plans to improve their transparency practices. In addition to leading to the 
publication of new budget documents, the workshops catalysed national events whereby 
various stakeholders discussed current transparency practices and opportunities. This 
engagement has been instrumental for many of the offices studied to initiate and/
or deepen partnership with MoFs. Collaboration with the IBP has since been formally 
extended through 2020, with UNICEF financially supporting the Open Budget Survey 2019 
in nearly all countries studied. The ongoing monitoring activities will continue to create 
entry points for UNICEF offices to work with MoFs on a variety of public finance issues, 
and should remain a high priority. 
Provide technical assistance to improve budget transparency practices
Building on ongoing monitoring activities, UNICEF offices have many opportunities to 
support counterparts to produce more and better budget information. One key contribution 
has been the production of budget briefs, the majority of which are co-published with 
government and posted on MoF websites. Another important contribution is supporting 
MoFs to develop their Citizens Budgets, which occurred in several offices studied for 
the first time (Eswatini, Madagascar and Mozambique) as well as other UNICEF offices 
that were not part of the study (Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe). As mentioned 
earlier, UNICEF Madagascar has also worked with the MoF to produce in-year Budget 
Execution Citizens’ Reports. In addition, most offices have supported technical reviews 
of key budget documents prior to publication (e.g. Executive Budget Proposals and Year-
End Reports). As UNICEF’s partnerships with the IBP and MoFs grow, there should be 
ample opportunities to provide higher value technical support in the budget transparency 
domain. 
One area that should be explored is at the subnational level. Here budget transparency 
efforts could build on UNICEF Uganda’s approach to generate and analyse budget and 
performance data at the district level. Another innovation is in Malawi, where UNICEF 
supported the adaption of the Open Budget Survey at the district level, which could be 
replicated in other contexts as well. 
Facilitate budget discussion forums
The country studies further demonstrated opportunities for UNICEF to create new 
processes to debate budget issues. The Open Budget Survey 2017 shows that ESAR is 
among the worst performing regions in the world in terms of budget transparency, but the 
situation is more unsettling when looking at the budget oversight and public participation 
components of the survey. To this end, many UNICEF offices could kill two birds with one 
stone by helping to initiate and institutionalize public hearings on the budget. In Malawi 
and Mozambique, UNICEF helped organize public hearings on the budget for the first time, 
which have since become institutionalized. In a sense, this approach allows parliament 
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to gain insights – and free recommendations – so that they can make meaningful changes 
before signing off on the budget, while also giving citizens the chance to voice concerns 
and help shape the budget. Beyond the approval stage, public forums can be held at other 
points in the budget cycle (e.g. to discuss the Executive’s Budget Proposal, the Mid-Year 
Report and the Audit Report), which can similarly contribute to parliament’s oversight 
function and improve public participation. All of these entry points can be explored by 
UNICEF offices. 
Support supreme audit institutions and public accounts committees
Support to supreme audit institutions (or courts of auditors) also helps to construct 
a climate of accountability and justice, and to encourage more efficient spending. The 
budget approval stage is not the only phase where MPs can engage in the budget. 
One good opportunity that is rarely seized in the region is for MPs to follow up on the 
recommendations issued by the auditor general, especially through the public accounts 
committees. MPs in these committees should be targeted in any formal training 
programmes initiated by UNICEF and could also benefit from support to review budget 
execution reports and auditor general reports.
Lobby for relevant PFM reforms
In country contexts where entry points are scarce, lobbying for the adoption of certain 
PFM reforms could make sense. Despite UNICEF’s widespread engagement in budget 
transparency, many of the countries studied have limited opportunities to influence 
budget processes. The reasons vary from political unrest (e.g. Burundi) to low compliance 
to existing legislation (e.g. Malawi) to generally closed budget processes (e.g. Comoros). 
In these cases, UNICEF could team up with other partners to support PFM reforms that 
improve budget transparency and participation, which should ultimately lead to better 
opportunities for advocacy and dialogue. This could include expanding the PFM law to 
require publishing of internal budget information (e.g. on execution), revising the Chart of 
Accounts and/or introducing programme-based budgeting in one or more social sectors. 
In the long run, supporting these types of reforms will create a stronger PFM system that 
should foster more transparent and open budget process.
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CHAPTER 4. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Four key findings emerge from the fiscal space and political economy analyses that were 
recently conducted in 16 ESAR countries. First, the regional outlook for expenditure on 
human capital is characterized by both hope and discouragement. Second, all countries 
have at least one very strong option to create fiscal space in support of greater investments 
in human capital, while most countries have a variety of promising options that can 
be explored. Third, creating fiscal space, in practice, requires overcoming significant 
challenges. And fourth, opportunities abound for UNICEF country offices to influence 
PFM processes and support the progressive scale-up of investment in sectors that are 
fundamental to child well-being and the formation of human capital. These findings are 
discussed below.
4.1 The outlook for expenditure on human capital
It is likely that investment in core human capital sectors will slightly decrease overall 
for the region in the near term, but this will vary significantly across countries. Based on 
the modified macro-fiscal programming models, real per child expenditure was projected 
to decline by an average of about 6 per cent over five-year periods. At the country level, 
however, the outlooks were very diverse. Five countries were projected to undergo deep 
contractions in real per child expenditure (between 10 and 30 per cent) and three to have 
smaller declines (in the 2-5 per cent range), while modest increases (around 3.5 per cent) 
were forecast in two countries and substantial rises (between 20 and 90 per cent) in six 
countries.
The projection exercises show that investment outlooks are inherently tied to economic 
outlooks. Most of the countries that were projected to experience declining expenditure 
over the near term were those where recent sluggish or no growth economic situations 
were expected to continue, such as in southern Africa. This highlights a critical reality: fiscal 
space can shrink. On the other side, booming economies in places like Kenya, Rwanda and 
the United Republic of Tanzania were linked to high expectations for greater expenditure 
on human capital. Angola was the major exception, which is the country where the biggest 
growth in expenditure was projected to occur according to the baseline scenario. As 
discussed, its economic outlook is not great once adjusting for changes to prices and the 
size of the population. However, early in 2018 the government committed to increase the 
budget priority given to the education and health sectors in order to progressively fulfil 
its commitments to the Abuja Declaration and Education for All by 2022. While time will 
tell whether such promises come to fruition, this instance demonstrates that politics can 
supersede economics in terms of affecting investment trajectories. 
4.2 Options to boost expenditure on human capital
There is no shortage of strategies available to governments if they are serious about 
developing the human capital bases of their countries. A review of information from 
global databases and the macro-fiscal programming models showed that all countries 
have, at a minimum, one very strong option to raise expenditure over the near term. One 
group of countries – Botswana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of 
Tanzania – were found to have at least four high-potential categories available for further 
investigation, while Angola, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia had three each. Some 
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of the most promising areas at regional level are highlighted below.
Reprioritizing the budget appears to be the most promising avenue to enhance fiscal 
space in the region. The country projections showed this to have the biggest potential 
returns. Reallocating resources away from non-priority areas to human capital sectors 
was found to potentially increase real per child expenditure by around 6 per cent annually 
above the baseline scenarios, on average. When combined with other data, reprioritization 
was identified as having very strong potential in 13 of the 16 countries studied. 
Increasing revenue is another promising pathway. While most countries are expected to 
benefit from natural revenue growth, rising prices and populations will subdue the impact 
of larger budgets on the development of human capital. Nonetheless, the low capacity to 
extract taxes from the economy observed in many countries underscores the opportunities 
for domestic resource mobilization. Some governments may be able to introduce new 
taxes (e.g. on property) or to raise existing VAT, CIT and PIT rates. However, this may not be 
politically feasible in contexts of fiscal austerity or slow growth. In contrast, strengthening 
tax collection capacity appears to be the most realistic approach for most governments.
Other good options to augment fiscal space in sub-groups of countries include advocating 
for more ODA, cracking down on IFFs and addressing spending inefficiencies. On the ODA 
front, attracting grants and concessional loans is a particularly good option for LICs. If 
they can convince donors that additional resources will deliver strong value for money 
and be accompanied by robust accountability mechanisms, many governments can make 
a compelling case for increased funding given the prevailing human capital deficits. 
Meanwhile, addressing IFFs is one of the more intriguing approaches for the region. 
The estimated magnitude of flows is staggering in many countries, and any actions that 
can prevent, capture and effectively tax these resources could go a long way to raising 
expenditure on human capital. Lastly, the review of budget credibility rates in the education 
and health sectors revealed the severity of one major type of spending inefficiency, 
especially for capital items, which has received little attention in most countries and affects 
actual levels of investment in human capital. Strengthening the design of budgets as well 
as reducing leakages and waste could also bolster the impact of human capital budgets 
across the region. 
4.3 Fiscal space headwinds
Despite the ample opportunities, the fiscal space outlook is far from ideal. Every seemingly 
great idea at country level must overcome a variety of challenges to both create new 
resources and then direct them into human capital sectors. 
• Reprioritization: Human capital is often not a high budget priority for politicians, who 
are much more inclined to invest in things that keep them in power either physically 
(e.g. defence and public administration) or by helping to garner future votes through 
quick, visible results (e.g. transport, roads, energy, agriculture and subsidies). 
Successful reprioritization therefore requires overcoming the political incentives that 
underlie budget allocation decisions, which is not an easy task in any context. Debt 
accumulation adds additional complications in many countries, as growing repayment 
burdens further reduce flexibility for reallocating resources. 
• Revenue: Real GDP growth has been disappointing in most countries and has hampered 
natural revenue growth. As such, if governments cannot work more effectively with 
the private sector and generate higher rates, larger human capital budgets are very 
unlikely. At the same time, while improved tax administration may be one of the best 
prospects in the region, most revenue authorities have had strategies in place for many 
years. This indicates that meaningful tax collection gains will be difficult to realize in 
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the near term in the absence of a major push by both politicians and technocrats – and 
of course greater willingness from citizens and business to pay their dues. 
• ODA: Free and/or cheap money should always be a good thing, but over-dependence 
and persistence of parallel systems can distort domestic investment priorities, 
undermine national capacity and plans, and lead to duplication of activities and hence 
wastage, among other problems. Traditional donor funding will also be increasingly 
more difficult to come by for the new LMICs in the region, as donors are committed to 
better targeting ODA toward the least developed countries.
• IFFs: Some of the key actions to deal with IFFs are related to eliminating tax evasion 
and hence strengthening tax administrative capacity, which was already noted as a 
complex and timely process. Many others are related to corruption – at borders, in 
procurement processes, in facilitating illegal activities and so on. While gathering better 
information on the scope of flows and effective responses acts as another barrier at 
the country level, improving tax administration and ending cultures of corruption are 
tall orders. 
• Spending efficiencies: Improving the implementation of budgets in human capital 
sectors requires successfully addressing diverse bottlenecks. At central level, these 
can range from inaccurate revenue forecasting and weak spending controls to slow 
disbursement processes and imperfect financial management information systems; 
at the sector level, this can involve the limited availability of skilled personnel, flawed 
budget designs and plans, poor cash management practices, complex and/or non-
competitive procurement processes, donor funding delays and so on. In other words, 
there are no easy fixes to the multitude of technical challenges. 
4.4 Opportunities for UNICEF to influence the investment climate 
The political economy analyses revealed numerous opportunities for UNICEF to more 
effectively engage in PFM processes and explore the fiscal space strategies identified 
above. While these are inherently context-specific and must be tailored to policy and 
budgeting dynamics and actors at country level, many common entry points are evident 
across the region. As the report presents, these cut across the budget cycle as well as the 
budget transparency and accountability agenda. 
• Strategic dialogue and planning: Although spaces for external actors to influence 
policy dialogue have decreased in recent years, channels exist both inside and outside 
formal budget processes to introduce messages about the importance of investing in 
human capital. At the national level, it is important to develop the right “pitch,” which 
could potentially include the demographic boom, the economic growth agenda, social 
protection and/or decentralization. This may require developing investment cases that 
demonstrate the returns on investment or the economic costs of not investing more 
in particular area. With the MoF, offices should place special attention on initiating 
and cultivating strong ties around child-responsive budgeting, which could focus on 
strengthening budget guidelines as well as budget framework papers to better reflect 
the needs of children. At the sector level, where UNICEF has its strongest relationships, 
helping to cost strategies and plans presents a universal opportunity; if it is unclear 
what the resource needs are and how additional resources will be used, ministries will 
have little hope of attracting significant new funding. 
• Budget preparation: Budget proposals are one of the most important determinants 
of whether a sector will be granted an additional funding request during negotiations 
with the MoF. The political economy studies frequently identified that the quality of 
budget proposals was underwhelming and support to strengthen them could be 
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extremely valuable. This would also provide a natural opportunity to guide the design 
of sectoral budgets, ensuring that they are directly linked to existing strategies and 
plans, focused on key priorities and geographic regions and population groups that 
have the greatest needs, support the most cost-effective interventions, and reflect the 
optimal balance of spending across service delivery levels as well as recurrent and 
capital items. A related constraint commonly noted was the weak position of social 
sector ministries to dialogue with the MoF. Here, UNICEF can leverage its partnership 
with the MoF to both open and support discussions with line ministries as soon as the 
budget ceilings are established. 
• Budget approval: Once the national budget has been drafted, UNICEF has a great 
opportunity to support the parliament’s review of the proposals. Several offices have 
very successfully carried out rapid analyses to highlight concerning allocative trends 
among human capital sectors, which were then used to influence parliamentary 
debate and inform recommendations before the budget was approved. There are 
also strategic entry points to strengthen the parliament’s budget oversight capacity. 
Successful approaches that could be replicated include developing formal training 
programmes to enhance the understanding of MPs of how the budget affects children 
and contributes to human capital as well as helping to establish budgetary analysis 
functions inside parliament, including through parliamentary budget offices. The 
budgetary oversight powers of parliaments vary widely across the region, so these 
approaches should be weighed against their potential to affect investment decisions 
vis-à-vis engaging with line ministries and the MoF.
• Budget execution: The quality of budget execution has a direct impact on the amount 
and impact of investment in human capital sectors. Given this, arguably one of 
UNICEF’s biggest contributions to enhancing fiscal space is supporting counterparts 
to improve the implementation of their budgets. While all 16 country offices are 
monitoring sector budgets through annual budget briefs, very few are obtaining 
execution data, which emerges as a universal low-hanging fruit. From there, offices 
could begin to diagnose the underlying bottlenecks and identify solutions, which 
could be done through dedicated sections in PERs and PETS or through standalone 
budget execution assessments. There may also be strategic openings to work with the 
MoF to generate disaggregated budget execution data so that routine performance 
monitoring becomes institutionalized across the budget cycle. 
• Budget transparency and accountability: The ability to advocate for greater funding 
for human capital sectors ultimately starts with having access to reliable information 
and meaningful discussion platforms. One big opportunity for UNICEF is to continue 
actively monitoring budget transparency and calling for improved practices, which 
most offices have done since 2017 in close partnership with the IBP. This has increasingly 
involved providing technical assistance, including to help MoFs to develop Citizens 
Budgets and transparency web portals as well as to expand the amount of information 
contained in budget documents. Several country offices have also organized public 
hearings at various stages of the budget cycle, which is a great approach that could 
be replicated in many contexts. Another opportunity is to work with DPs to support 
relevant PFM reforms, such as updating PFM laws, revising the Chart of Accounts or 
introducing programme-based budgeting, all of which can strengthen PFM systems to 
generate more and better budget information. 
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4.5 The final thought
Fiscal space for children and human capital is a big challenge. Identifying an opportunity 
is one thing; creating fiscal space in practice – i.e. overcoming the headwinds – and then 
transforming it into greater investments in human capital sectors – i.e. influencing the 
politics that underlie budget allocation decisions – are entirely different and complex 
processes. Nonetheless, the critical starting point is to understand the likely human capital 
investment trajectory. And while the modelling exercises suggested mixed outcomes, 
the very low human capital bases in all countries mean that maximum efforts should be 
devoted to increasing expenditure as quickly as possible. UNICEF’s challenge is therefore 
to influence that trajectory. 
The country studies offer a strategic road map. In all the contexts, the fiscal space analyses 
identified at least one category that shows strong potential over the near term. From here, 
it is important to update and re-evaluate those promising scenarios, and to develop a plan 
to operationalize the best ideas. As revealed in the political economy analyses, although 
daunting, country offices can navigate forward by adapting to the dynamics of the budget 
process. They can also pursue multiple strategies, recognizing that small amounts of fiscal 
space from different sources can significantly alter the investment trajectory and – if well 
used – transform children’s lives and the economic and social outlooks of their countries.
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ANNEX 1. 
STEPS TO CARRY OUT THE FISCAL 
SPACE PROJECTION EXERCISES
Step 1. Compile historical data for a first projection analysis and update for 
subsequent projection analyses
1. “State-of-the-world” annual variables:
A. Growth rate of volume of world trade 
B. Growth rate of the year-average world price-level indicator (e.g., U.S. GDP deflator, 
World Bank Manufacturing Unit Value index, etc.
C. Growth rates of relevant international export (e.g. relevant mining and other 
export commodity prices) and import prices (e.g. crude oil).
D. World interest-rate indicator (e.g. London Interbank Offered Rate or LIBOR)
 Â Note: These data are available from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database.
2. Key macroeconomic indicators:
A. Growth rate of real GDP
B. Growth rates of key sectoral output values (e.g. oil)
C. Growth rate of year-average and year-end price-level indicators (e.g. consumer 
price index, GDP deflator)
D. Growth rate of year-average and year-end exchange-rate indicators
E. Growth rate of overall population
F. Growth rate of population cohorts (e.g. persons of school age, persons past 
working age, etc.)
 Â Note: These data should be available from country sources. Monthly price-level 
and exchange-rate data are also available from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database, while population growth rates are available from UN DESA World 
Population Prospects: 2017 Revision.
3. National-expenditure accounts:
A. Overall Investment  (including gross fixed capital formation, net increase in 
inventory stocks
B. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services: 
i. Merchandise exports by commodity type
ii. Non-factor services exports
iii. Merchandise imports by import category (consumption, oil, non-oil intermediate, 
capital)
iv. Non-factor services imports
E. Government consumption
F. Non-government consumption
 Â Note: These data should be available from government sources. 
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4. Overall executed central-government budget accounts:
A.   Non-interest expenditure flows, classified by expenditure sector (education, 
health, etc.) and subclassified by economic category (staff remuneration, non-staff 
goods and services, other current expenditure, gross fixed capital formation, and 
other capital expenditure).
B.  External and internal interest due
C.  Revenue flows, classified into tax and non-tax revenue, with tax revenue sub-
classified into revenue type (personal income tax, company income tax, excises, 
value-added tax, customs levies, etc.)
D. Financing flows, classified into external and internal financing flows
 Â Note: These data should be available from government sources. 
Step 2. Set programming assumptions for each projection analysis (and re-
view and reset, as required)
1. Assumptions for the “state-of-the-world” annual variables:
A.  Growth rate of the world trade volume
B.  Growth rate of the year-average world price-level indicator (e.g., U.S. GDP deflator, 
World Bank Manufacturing Unit Value index, etc.
C.   Growth rates of relevant international export (e.g. relevant mining and other 
export commodity prices) and import prices (e.g. crude oil).
D.  World interest-rate indicator (e.g. LIBOR)
2. Assumptions for the key macroeconomic indicators:
A. Growth rate of real GDP
B. Growth rates of key sectoral output values (e.g. oil)
C. Growth rate of year-average and year-end price-level indicators (e.g. consumer 
price index, GDP deflator)
D. Growth rate of year-average and year-end exchange-rate indicators
E. Growth rate of overall population
F. Growth rate of population cohorts (e.g. persons of school age, persons past 
working age, etc.)
3. Assumptions for the national-expenditure accounts:
A. Investment:
i. Incremental capital-output ratio (to determine overall gross fixed capital 
formation)
ii. Growth rate of the net increase in inventory stocks
B. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services:
i. Merchandise exports by commodity type:
a. Growth rate of volume (depending on world market growth rates)
b. Growth rate of the unit price
ii. Non-factor services exports:
a. Growth rate of volume (depending on world market growth rates)
b. Growth rate of the unit price
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iii. Merchandise imports by import category (consumption, oil, non-oil intermediate, 
capital):
a. Growth rate of volume (depending on real GDP growth)
b. Growth rate of the unit price
iv. Non-factor services imports:
a. Growth rate of volume (depending on world market growth rates or on 
merchandise imports)
b. Growth rate of the unit price
4. Assumptions to determine central-government budget accounts:
A. Growth rates of non-interest expenditure flows classified by expenditure sector 
and subclassified by economic category.
B. Interest rates on external and internal debt
C. Growth rates of revenue flows
D. Growth rates of external-debt disbursements to the central government
E. Growth rates of external-debt repayment by the central government 
Step 3. Calculate projections of the national-expenditure and the fiscal 
accounts
1. Complete the multiannual projections of the national-expenditure accounts – that is, 
calculate the residual-account calculation of non-government consumption for each 
projection year by applying the national-expenditure accounts identity.
2. Complete the multiannual projections of the central-government accounts – that is, 
calculate the residual-account calculation of the net increase in the net internal debt by 
applying the fiscal-accounts identity.
Step 4. Evaluate the projection results, according to different criteria
1. Would projected real expenditure on priority sectors grow adequately based on the 
existing funding gaps?
2. Would the projected increase in the net internal debt be larger than internal financial 
markets could bear? In particular, would the central government’s internal debt grow 
too rapidly as a percentage of GDP?
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ANNEX 2. 
METHODOLOGY FOR STANDARDIZING 
THE MACRO-FISCAL PROGRAMMING 
MODELS
This annex describes the methodology used to standardize the macro-fiscal programming 
models in order to allow for very preliminary comparison of the evolution of per child 
expenditure on core human capital sectors according to the baseline and select alternative 
scenarios across the 16 countries. It describes the adjustments made to the baseline and 
alternative scenarios. This is followed by a discussion of the main caveats and interpretative 
warnings. 
Adjustments to the baseline scenarios
The steps taken to estimate comparable projected results for the baseline scenario are 
listed below, while Table 1 summarizes the key differences between the original models 
and the adjusted models.
1. Extract expenditure (all available sectors), GDP (nominal as well as constant US$ 
and exchange rates) and CPI data for all years covered (historical and projections) 
in the baseline scenarios for each of the 16 models, which reflect all of the original 
assumptions built into each model as presented in the “projection” output sheets and 
described in each country report.
2. Compare nominal and constant US$ and exchange rates, as well as CPI data in each 
model, with those presented in the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 
2018) to double check the accuracy of the information.
3. Convert all data reported in thousands, millions and billions to actual values.
4. Calculate the local currency value of total human capital expenditure for all years 
using a universal definition of human capital that consists of the education, health 
and social protection sectors48 (Note: The child protection, nutrition and WASH sectors 
were excluded as they were not covered in all 16 studies and would therefore limit the 
accuracy of cross-country comparisons).
5. Calculate human capital expenditure as % of GDP for all years by dividing the local 
currency value of human capital expenditure by the local currency value of GDP. 
6. Calculate per child expenditure on human capital in constant US$ and exchange rates 
for all years by multiplying expenditure as % of GDP by GDP in constant US$ and 
exchange rates49 and then dividing by the total population aged 0-17 (based on UN 
DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, medium variant estimates).
7. Calculate the projected change of expenditure per child on human capital in constant 
US$ and exchange rates after five years by comparing the average value of the most 
recent two years of actual data with the predicted value in year 5 of each model.50
48  Coverage for all three sectors is universal across the sample except for Comoros, which did not include social protection.
49  The conversion base year varied for the country studies from 2006 (Botswana), 2014 (Lesotho and South Africa) and 
2016 (Angola and Kenya), with all other countries using 2015.
50  The projection periods varied across the sample: ten countries used 5 years, one 6 years, three 7 years, one 8 years 
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Adjustments to the alternative scenarios
The steps taken to isolate the extra fiscal space exclusively created by each alternative 
scenario and to compare the projected results after five years relative to the baseline 
results are listed below. Table 2 then summarizes the key differences between the original 
models and the adjusted models.
1. Preserve the standardization of variables as described above in each of the 16 models, 
including the definitions of human capital sectors (education, health and social 
protection) and the child populations (aged 0-17). 
2. Adjust the financing assumptions of each alternative scenario in all country models 
so that the levels of internal and external debt and debt repayment are the same as 
those in the baseline scenarios for all years; the one exception is for the alternative 
scenarios that involved increasing debt to finance greater expenditure on human 
capital, whereby the assumptions built into the alternative scenarios were maintained. 
 Important clarifications for this step: One key feature of the alternative scenarios 
presented in the country reports is that the additional fiscal space that was generated 
was not exclusively used to increase expenditure on human capital sectors. In contrast, 
most alternative scenarios directed at least a portion of the new resources toward the 
repayment of internal and/or external debt over time, resulting both in lower debt 
levels and in increased (or not) expenditure per child at the end of the projection period 
relative to the baseline scenario. Some alternative scenarios also used additional 
fiscal space to support non-priority expenditure. In practice, this means that many 
and one 10 years.
Table 1. Summary of main differences between the original and adjusted models in the 
baseline scenario
Parameter Original model Adjusted model
Definition of human capital National (combination of child pro-
tection, education, health, nutrition, 
social protection and WASH) 
Education, health and social protec-
tion
Definition of the child population National (ranges from the under 15 
to under 20 population)
0-17
Base year of results First year of projection period Average value of the latest two 
years of actual information
End year of results National (ranges from projection 
year 5 to projection year 10)
Projection year 5
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alternative scenarios did not demonstrate the entire potential of a fiscal space option 
to benefit investment in human capital, which was one of the main objectives of this 
regional report and hence the rationale for the adjustments. 
3. Re-run the model to estimate the value of expenditure per child on human capital 
in constant US$ and exchange rates in projection for year five based on the above 
modifications. 
4. Calculate the difference between the above value and the value of per child expenditure 
on human capital in constant US$ and exchange rates as predicted under the baseline 
scenario in year five. 
Caveats
Despite the above changes to the baseline and alternative scenarios, there are important 
limitations to the accuracy of predictions as well as cross-country comparisons presented 
in this report. First, all scenarios – including the baseline – are laden with assumptions, 
and increasing or decreasing future optimism about one or more indicators would likely 
produce a very different set of results. Second, the values of all data inputted into the models 
were ultimately converted into constant US$ and exchange rates for analytical purposes. 
Presenting the information in real local currency value, PPP or constant international US$ 
would therefore also affect the results. And third, most of the indicators that were included 
in the models have already been updated, as the macro-economic and fiscal situation has 
evolved in each country. This means that the estimates presented would further change 
if the latest information were inputted into each model and the baseline and alternative 
scenarios were re-run. 
Parameter Original model Adjusted model
Definition of human capital Combination of child protection, 
education, health, nutrition, social 
protection and WASH
Education, health and social protec-
tion
Definition of the child population Ranges from the under 15 to under 
20 population
Under 18
End year of results Ranges from projection year 5 to 
projection year 10
Projection year 5
Debt repayment The same or greater than the base-
line scenario
The same as the baseline scenario
Use of fiscal space For debt repayment, human capital 
expenditure or a combination of 
both
Only for human capital expenditure
Table 2. Summary of main differences between the original and adjusted models in the 
alternative scenarios
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The cross-country comparisons should also be interpreted with great caution. This starts 
with the variety of country-specific issues just described. Beyond those, the definition 
and identification of education, health and social protection expenditure varied across 
the sample, which means that the levels nor the changes over time in human capital 
expenditure cannot be effectively compared across countries. There are further challenges 
to comparing the levels of human capital expenditure due to the use of different base 
years for converting local currency values into constant US$ and exchange rates.
Caveats aside, the above restrictions underpin most modelling exercises and cross-
country analyses, which are only intended to be illustrative. This applies resoundingly 
to all findings from the country models as well as those from the modified macro-fiscal 
programming models presented in this report. As such the country and regional-level 
analyses are only intended to offer a very preliminary idea of fiscal space options and 
strategies that could be considered for further investigation and discussion in an open 
dialogue at country level, and should not be taken at face value. 
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ANNEX 3.  
FISCAL SPACE COUNTRY PROFILES: THE 
METHODOLOGY
This annex describes the methodology used to assess the near-term fiscal space outlooks 
for the 16 countries as presented in Table 2.01 and Table 2.02 in Section 2.6 of the report. 
The main steps are summarized below. 
1. Convert all of the projected results generated by the adjusted macro-fiscal 
programming country models (and presented in Section 2.5) from changes in real per 
child expenditure on human capital over a five-year period to average annual changes, 
which was simply carried out by dividing them by five. 
2. Next, all of the indicators presented in Section 2.5 were transformed into a single 
database, which included all of the modelled scenarios as well as information drawn 
from global database. The different indicators were also aligned to the seven general 
categories of fiscal space examined in the report, which included revenue, ODA, 
reprioritization, efficiency of spending, borrowing, fiscal savings and IFFs. 
3. Transform 15 fiscal space indicators presented in Section 2.5 into a single database, 
organized by the general seven general categories.
4. Develop thresholds for all 15 indicators to determine fiscal space potential (low, 
medium and high). The thresholds are presented in Table 3 at the end of this Annex 
along with the summary statistics of the sample and the data sources. 
 Â Notes: Quartile values were used to determine most cut-offs, but in some instances 
this was not possible or did not make sense. These included: (i) tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP (high potential was defined as anything below the average for 
sub-Saharan Africa: 15.6 per cent); (ii) debt distress ratings (medium potential was 
defined as a low rating by the IMF with everything else low potential); and (iii) the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund (high potential meant a fund existed and 
everything else was low). In addition, given that the results from the alternative 
scenarios presented in this report showed positive improvement over the baseline 
scenario results in all countries, the threshold value for each of these indicators 
was used to define between “medium” or “high” potential only. 
5. Apply the thresholds to estimate the fiscal space potential for each country based on 
the 15 indicators, where applicable (i.e. the thresholds were not applied in instances 
where a country did not have an alternative scenario presented or a debt distress 
rating). The results are presented in Table 2.01 in Section 2.6 of the report.
6. Estimate the categorical fiscal space potential for each country based on the average 
values of the available indicators. This was not possible for the fiscal savings or IFFs 
categories as there was only indicator for each. The results are presented in Table 2.02 
in Section 2.6 of the report.
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Table 3. Indicators and thresholds to determine fiscal space potential
Category Indicator
Fiscal space threshold determinants Summary statistics
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Natural fiscal 
space
1. average annual change of real per child expenditure on 
human capital over 5-year period (as %)
0.15 < n < 5.70 Quartiles -1.2 6.8 -2.4 0.1 5.7 modelling projections
Revenue
2. average annual change of real per capita general 
government revenue, 2019-21 (as %)
0.01 < n < 3.03 Quartiles 1.4 2.2 0.0 1.1 3.0 IMF projections
3. average annual increase of real per child expenditure on 
human capital above baseline scenario over 5-year period (as 
%)
na n < 3.07 Quartiles 2.2 1.7 0.9 1.3 3.1 modelling projections
4. tax revenue, latest available (% of GDP) 23.97 > n < 15.64
SSA avg and 75 
percentile
18.9 7.9 12.8 15.8 24.0 IMF projections
ODA
5. average annual increase of real per child expenditure on 
human capital above baseline scenario over 5-year period (as 
%)
na n < 1.67 Quartiles 3.4 … 1.7 2.0 4.9 modelling projections
6. average change of real per capita net and official ODA, 2016-
18 and 2019-21 period averages (as %)
0 < n < 5.51 Quartiles 8.3 15.8 -3.4 5.5 16.8 projections based on OECD
Reprioritization
7. average annual increase of real per child expenditure on 
human capital above baseline scenario over 5-year period (as 
%)
na n < 1.07 Quartiles 6.4 … 1.1 3.4 9.1 modelling projections
8. military-to-health expenditure ratio, 2017 or latest available 
(as %)
0 < n < 0.15 Quartiles 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 SIPRI, WHO
Spending 
efficiency
9. average annual increase of real per child expenditure on 
human capital above baseline scenario over 5-year period (as 
%)
na n < 1.54 Quartiles 2.5 … 1.5 2.4 3.4 modelling projections
10. education and health sector budget credibility rates, latest 
available 3-year average (as %)
0.97 < n < 0.78 Quartiles 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.9 1.0
budget briefs, PERs, PEFA, 
BOOST
Borrowing
11. average annual increase of real per child expenditure on 
human capital above baseline scenario over 5-year period (as 
%)
na n < 3.27 Quartiles 2.8 … 1.2 1.6 3.3 modelling projections
12. debt distress rating, latest available
moderate 
or above
low na Ratings … … … … … IMF DSAs
13. general government gross debt, 2019 (% of GDP) 49.34 > n > 38.56 Quartiles 52.9 23.7 38.6 49.3 59.1 IMF projections
Fiscal savings 14. sovereign wealth fund established no na yes Fund exists … … … … …
Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute
IFFs 15. IFFs, 2011-13 period average (% of GDP) 3.2 < n < 8.12 Quartiles 7.9 5.8 3.2 8.1 12.0 Global Financial Integrity
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